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MASS MONITORING 
AVLANA K. EISENBERG* 
ABSTRACT 
Business is booming for criminal justice monitoring technology: these 
days “ankle bracelet” refers as often to an electronic monitor as to 
jewelry. Indeed, the explosive growth of electronic monitoring (“EM”) for 
criminal justice purposes—a phenomenon which this Article terms “mass 
monitoring”—is among the most overlooked features of the otherwise well-
known phenomenon of mass incarceration. 
This Article addresses the fundamental question of whether EM is 
punishment. It finds that the origins and history of EM as a progressive 
alternative to incarceration—a punitive sanction—support characterization 
of EM as punitive, and that EM comports with the goals of dominant 
punishment theories. Yet new uses of EM have complicated this narrative. 
The Article draws attention to the expansion of EM both as a substitute for 
incarceration and as an added sanction, highlighting the analytic 
importance of what it terms the “substitution/addition distinction.” The 
Article argues that, as a punitive sanction, EM can be justified when used 
as a substitute for incarceration, but that its use as an added sanction may 
result in excessive punishment and raises significant constitutional and 
policy concerns. 
 The Article’s findings have crucial implications for hotly contested 
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questions over whether monitoring can be imposed retroactively and 
whether pretrial house arrest plus monitoring (which resembles the post-
conviction use of monitoring as a substitute for incarceration) should count 
toward time served. The Article provides a framework for addressing these 
questions and, at the same time, offers practical policy guidance that will 
enable courts and policymakers to ensure that EM programs are genuinely 
a cost-saving, progressive substitute for incarceration rather than another 
destructive expansion of government control. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, electronic monitoring (“EM”) of those convicted or 
suspected of crimes has become so ubiquitous in American society that the 
term “ankle bracelet,”1 which once designated a fashion accessory, now 
frequently refers to a judicially imposed electronic monitor.2 EM use in the 
United States expanded from fewer than one hundred people in 1984 to 
more than 200,000 by 2009, 3  and every state has enacted legislation 
enabling the use of EM for criminal justice purposes.4 In California, some 
offenders serve their entire sentences in their communities, wearing Global 
Positioning System (“GPS”) ankle bracelets 24/7. 5  In Rhode Island, 
eligible offenders may opt to serve their sentences in a Community 
Confinement program where they are subject to home confinement plus 
radio frequency monitoring. 6  In Florida, EM routinely is imposed as a 
condition of pretrial release, sometimes instead of, and often in addition to, 
bail. 7  Wisconsin is one of twelve states where offenders who have 
completed their sentences may be subject to lifetime monitoring.8 
 
 1. The terms “ankle bracelet,” “ankle monitor,” “electronic monitor,” and “tag” have been used 
interchangeably in the criminal justice context. See, e.g., Mike Nellis, Surveillance, Stigma and Spatial 
Constraint  The Ethical Challenges of Electronic Monitoring, in ELECTRONICALLY MONITORED 
PUNISHMENT 193, 203–05 (Mike Nellis et al. eds., 2013). 
 2. In the United States alone, more than 200,000 people are subject to electronic monitoring 
(“EM”). James Kilgore, Electronic Monitoring  Some Causes for Concern, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Mar. 
15, 2012), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/mar/15/electronic-monitoring-some-causes-for-
concern. The global market is “projected to be in excess of $6 billion by 2018.” SuperCom Ltd, 
SuperCom Introduces Enhanced PureSecurity™ Electronic Monitoring Suite, PR NEWSWIRE (July 9, 
2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/supercom-introduces-enhanced-puresecurity-
electronic-monitoring-suite-266404871.html. 
 3. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFENDER SUPERVISION WITH 
ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY: COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS RESOURCE 17 tbls.1a & 1b (2d ed. 2009), 
https://www.appa-net.org/eweb/docs/APPA/pubs/OSET_2.pdf; Mark E. Burns, Electronic Home 
Detention  New Sentencing Alternative Demands Uniform Standards, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 75, 82 (1992). 
 4. Deeanna M. Button et al., Using Electronic Monitoring to Supervise Sex Offenders  
Legislative Patterns and Implications for Community Corrections Officers, 20 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 
414, 423–24 (2009). 
 5. BRANDON MARTIN & RYKEN GRATTET, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., ALTERNATIVES TO 
INCARCERATION IN CALIFORNIA 1 (Apr. 2015), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_415B 
MR.pdf. 
 6. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF R.I., COMMUNITY CONFINEMENT 8, 
http://www.doc.ri.gov/rehabilitative/community/Community%20Confinement%20Info%20Booklet.doc 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2017). 
 7. See, e.g., Supervised Pretrial Release, LEON COUNTY, https://cms.leoncountyfl.gov/Home/ 
Departments/Office-of-Intervention-and-Detention-Alternatives/Supervised-Pretrial-Release (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2017). 
 8. These states include California, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004(b) (West 
2016); FLA. STAT. § 948.012(4) (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-14(e) (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
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Despite the scholarly focus on mass incarceration,9 this explosion of 
EM remains relatively unstudied. This Article fills that gap, identifying and 
analyzing this phenomenon, which it terms “mass monitoring.” The Article 
addresses the question central to future uses of EM in the criminal justice 
context: How should EM be characterized according to U.S. law? This 
question is especially timely, as bipartisan commitment to reducing the 
prison population has created newfound interest in alternatives to 
imprisonment generally,10 and in EM technology in particular.11 
The existing accounts of EM are incomplete. A rich criminological 
literature offers insights into the sociological effects of EM use but does 
not address the significant legal implications of mass monitoring.12 Where 
EM is mentioned in the legal literature, it is either reduced to merely one of 
its many uses or included as part of a larger phenomenon. For example, 
some accounts deal only with one aspect of EM use at a particular stage of 
 
3717(u) (2016); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.3(A)(3) (2016); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-
723(d)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520n (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.735(4) 
(2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.700, 144.103 (2016); 11 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 11-37-8.2.1 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2016). 
 9. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that mass incarceration of African Americans creates a 
modern caste system comparable to Jim Crow segregation); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND 
THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006) (discussing the 
development of four key movements that shaped the structure of the “carceral” state); IMPRISONING 
AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION (Mary Pattillo et al. eds., 2004) (collecting 
analyses of the impact of mass incarceration on family, community, and economic life); MARC MAUER, 
RACE TO INCARCERATE (2006) (discussing the evolution of incarceration in the United States over the 
past two hundred years); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) 
(arguing that America’s criminal justice system has unraveled and exploring solutions for repair); James 
Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration  Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21 
(2012) (disputing the analogy of Jim Crow to mass incarceration). 
 10. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, The Political Climate Change Surrounding Alternatives to 
Incarceration, 38 HUM. RTS. 6, 6 (2011). 
 11. See, e.g., More Electronic Monitoring Could Relieve Prison Overcrowding, Prison Officials 
Say, ARK. NEWS (Sept. 2, 2013, 1:09 AM), http://arkansasnews.com/sections/news/arkansas/more-
electronic-monitoring-could-relieve-prison-overcrowding-prison-officials; Erika Slife, More Non-
Violent Offenders Getting Home Monitoring in Cook County, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 5, 2011), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-10-05/news/chi-more-nonviolent-offenders-getting-home-
monitoring-in-cook-county-20111005_1_home-monitoring-house-arrest-defendants. 
 12. See, e.g., WILLIAM BALES ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE 
ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING 127 (2010); Richard Jones, The Electronic Monitoring of 
Offenders  Penal Moderation or Penal Excess?, 62 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 475, 477 (2014); J. 
Robert Lilly & Mike Nellis, The Limits of Techno-Utopianism  Electronic Monitoring in the United 
States of America, in ELECTRONICALLY MONITORED PUNISHMENT, supra note 1, at 21–22; Jamie S. 
Martin et al., Offenders’ Perceptions of House Arrest and Electronic Monitoring, 48 J. OFFENDER 
REHABILITATION 547, 547–67 (2009). 
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the criminal justice process, such as pretrial EM.13 But such a narrow focus 
does not lend itself to assessing the breadth and diversity of EM use 
throughout the criminal justice process. 
Other accounts are limited because they address EM in an abstract, 
general way, precluding questions about the legitimacy of specific uses of 
EM. For instance, scholars have discussed EM as one of many examples in 
the broad contexts of the ethics of mass surveillance,14 crime prevention 
through technology,15 and the collateral consequences of punishment.16 But 
by situating EM among other burgeoning technologies used by the criminal 
justice system or within the broad category of obstacles individuals face 
after completion of their sentences, the particular features, strengths, and 
limitations of EM are obscured.17 
This Article is the first sustained examination of mass monitoring and 
its place in the criminal justice landscape. It argues that EM as currently 
 
 13. See, e.g., Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE 
L.J. 1344, 1382–96 (2014) (proposing a “right to be monitored” in the pretrial context). 
 14. See generally, e.g., SURVEILLANCE: POWER, PROBLEMS, AND POLITICS (Sean P. Hier & Josh 
Greenberg eds., 2009); Gary Marx, Ethics for the New Surveillance, 14 INFO. SOC’Y 171 (1998). 
 15. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1328–40, 1394–400 
(2008) (linking various technologies, including DNA databasing, electronic indexing, biometric 
scanning, and EM, to the rise of preventative detention and the regulatory state, and concluding that all 
of these technologies should be subject to increased constitutional scrutiny). 
 16. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death  Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1816–21 (2012); Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences 
and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 306–17 (2015). 
 17. This tendency to generalize is most visible in three separate, though related, approaches to 
criticizing the use of EM. One approach invokes the historical association between EM (especially 
eavesdropping) and totalitarianism. Putting aside constitutional doctrine, this approach counsels that the 
use (let alone expansion) of EM is dangerous, repressive, and antidemocratic. See, e.g., Julie M. Houk, 
Electronic Monitoring of Probationers  A Step Toward Big Brother?, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 431, 
431–32 (1984). By invoking this visceral, negative association, this approach essentially cuts off 
consideration of a legitimate role for EM in the criminal justice system. A second approach counsels 
that EM should not be used because to be subject to monitoring technology as a punitive sanction is 
inherently distasteful, even inhumane. See generally, e.g., Richard Jones, The Electronic Monitoring of 
Offenders  Penal Moderation or Penal Excess?, 62 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 475 (2014). This 
approach in effect smuggles in an Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual” punishment analysis. 
However, in today’s world of lengthy sentences and often horrendous prison conditions, the general 
proposition that monitoring is more objectionable than incarceration seems unconvincing. The third and 
most well-articulated approach invokes the specter of “net widening,” a broad, generally amorphous 
concern about government encroachment on civil liberties. See generally, e.g., JAMES KILGORE, CTR. 
FOR MEDIA JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC MONITORING IS NOT THE ANSWER: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON A 
FLAWED ALTERNATIVE 12 (Oct. 2015), http://centerformediajustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/ 
EM-Report-Kilgore-final-draft-10-4-15.pdf. This approach to understanding EM, arguably a modern 
version of the antitotalitarianism approach, is unproductive because it puts EM in a heterogeneous 
category and assumes that net widening is inherently bad, thus obscuring the possibility that EM could 
also be a legitimate form of punishment. 
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practiced in the United States is a punitive sanction and, further, that EM is 
a justifiable form of punishment for sufficiently serious crimes.18 Crucially, 
once EM is understood to be a punitive sanction, questions about whether 
the imposition of EM in a particular instance is consistent with 
constitutional dictates or sound policy must take into account what this 
Article terms the “substitution/addition distinction,” whether EM is being 
used as a substitute for incarceration or as an added sanction. 
The Article thus challenges courts and policymakers that have deemed 
EM to be “merely regulatory.” For example, in 2016, writing for the 
Seventh Circuit in Belleau v. Wall, Judge Posner referred to a Wisconsin 
law imposing lifetime EM on citizens who had completed their sentences 
as “not punishment; it is prevention.”19 Relying on this classification of the 
EM sanction as non-punitive, the Seventh Circuit ruled that retroactive 
application of the Wisconsin law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution, which forbids retroactive punishment. 20  This 
Article highlights the inconsistency and illogic of legislative and judicial 
decisions that, on the one hand, provide for the use of EM as a substitute 
for incarceration (thus suggesting that EM is punitive), while, on the other 
hand, impose or condone the use of EM as “non-punitive.” 
The Article invokes history, sociology, and normative theory to 
support the argument that EM functions as a punitive sanction: EM has 
been and currently is imposed as a consequence of involvement in the 
criminal justice system, EM is experienced by those subject to it as 
punishment, and the use of EM as a punitive sanction accords with 
traditional theories of punishment.21 Accordingly, the Article argues, EM 
should be analyzed as a form of punishment. Importantly, this Article’s 
 
 18. The Article exposes and challenges widespread misconceptions that manifest as criticisms of 
EM from both ends of the political spectrum. One criticism of EM use—most commonly identified with 
the political left—is that EM is closely associated with totalitarian symbolism and assumed to be a 
violation of civil liberties. Another criticism of EM use—most widely identified with the political 
right—is that EM is not punitive, but rather merely regulation. This Article challenges both of these 
perspectives. It attacks the characterization of EM as non-punitive while also suggesting that EM could 
play a progressive role in criminal justice reform if deployed in a limited, non-additive manner. 
 19. Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10; Cal. Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995). 
 21. This Article’s inquiry into the character of EM resembles the Supreme Court’s inquiry into 
history, sociology, and normative theory when called to determine whether the imposition of a law is 
“punitive in effect” for purposes of a retroactivity analysis under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court 
applies the multi-factor test outlined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), asking 
whether the sanction at issue “has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes 
an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational 
connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose.” Smith v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 84, 97 (2003). 
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claim is not that one could never imagine a use of EM technology that is 
non-punitive,22  but rather that, as EM is currently used in the criminal 
justice context, it is punitive.23 
EM’s origins and the history of its use as a substitute for incarceration 
support its characterization as a punitive sanction. EM technology was 
initially conceived in the 1960s as a progressive alternative to 
imprisonment. 24  By the 1980s, radio frequency monitoring technology 
became commercially available and was used in conjunction with house 
arrest to alleviate dire prison overcrowding.25 This criminal justice use of 
the new EM technology skyrocketed in the late 1980s,26 and thus the mass 
monitoring phenomenon was born. 
The original conception and use of EM as a substitute for 
incarceration fits squarely within the parameters of punishment theory and 
is consistent with punitive goals, including retribution, expression of 
condemnation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.27 A retributivist, for example, 
could endorse EM as an alternative to incarceration if the harm visited 
upon offenders, including loss of liberty and privacy, is harm that the 
offender deserves to suffer. 28  The use of EM could also satisfy the 
expressivist, at least to the extent that monitoring devices are visible and 
limit the mobility of offenders, so that these devices are understood by 
other members of the community to signify wrongdoers being held 
accountable for their wrongs.29 
 
 22. Whether one would ever want to use EM for non-punitive purposes is a legislative, 
normative question that is beyond the scope of this inquiry. 
 23. Importantly, for EM not to be presumptively construed as punishment, monitoring programs 
would need to be conceptualized (and devices would need to be constructed) differently. This Article 
does not recommend such an expansion to the use of EM in civil contexts, but by way of illustration, if 
EM were used widely in non-criminal contexts, the social meaning of EM as punitive would necessarily 
evolve. Or, imagine if instead of bulky EM devices, monitoring programs utilized embedded chips. 
While many might object to a world where embedded chips were widely used in the civil context as 
nightmarish, crucially, their rationale would not be connected to punishment. Indeed, the existing 
concern of over-punishing would be transformed to a new, different problem—that of the 
technophobes’ nightmare—namely, the expanding influence of technology in modern life. This thought 
experiment highlights the importance of assessing the social meaning of a phenomenon—in this case, 
EM—as it is currently practiced. 
 24. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 25. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See infra Part I.B. The persuasiveness of the punitive justification, however, will vary 
depending upon whether EM functions as an alternative to incarceration or as an additional punishment 
beyond incarceration. See infra Part II.B. 
 28. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 29. See infra Part I.B.2. Furthermore, when used as an alternative to a criminal sentence, the 
strongest message-sending aspect—the criminal conviction itself—remains constant, regardless of 
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The deterrence theorist will care about whether EM is sufficiently 
undesirable to discourage potential criminal conduct.30 Firsthand accounts 
suggest that the loss of liberty, privacy, and autonomy is hugely significant 
to those subject to EM; in some cases, EM is experienced as scarcely less 
drastic than incarceration.31 EM also may contribute to deterrence simply 
because persons subject to EM are more easily apprehended, thus reducing 
enforcement gaps. Finally, rehabilitative principles support the use of EM, 
in conjunction with other programs, instead of incarceration.32 While EM is 
not inherently rehabilitative, preliminary studies of the use of EM as part of 
a more holistic reentry program, or as a means by which to preserve family 
connections, employment, and other social connections that would be lost 
if the offender were incarcerated, suggest that, as one element of a larger 
program, EM can serve rehabilitative ends.33 
By the late 1990s, a new monitoring technology entered the 
corrections scene that would both expand and complicate EM’s role as a 
burgeoning alternative to incarceration. GPS technology promised a new 
level of precision—the ability to monitor an individual’s location 24/7, 
whether inside or outside the home—giving rise to a broadening of EM 
uses and new populations subject to EM.34 With the introduction of GPS 
technology, two discrete strands of EM use emerged: as a substitute for 
incarceration and as an added condition to a preexisting punishment.35 
Distinguishing between these two strands of EM use—which this 
Article terms the “substitution/addition distinction”—helps to reconcile 
conflicting rhetoric about EM.36  Supporters of EM who focus on cost-
effectiveness and social benefits of EM tend to assume that EM is used as a 
substitute for incarceration, while opponents of EM focus on the dangerous 
 
whether the offender is monitored or incarcerated. While a sentence to prison arguably sends a stronger 
message, on the other hand, while in prison, everyone with whom the offender comes into contact is 
either also incarcerated or part of the criminal justice machinery. By contrast, when subject to EM, the 
offender is perhaps more persistently aware of the differences between the life of someone subject to 
criminal sanction and the lives of those who are not. 
 30. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 31. See, e.g., Peter B. Wood & Harold G. Grasmick, Toward the Development of Punishment 
Equivalencies  Male and Female Inmates Rate the Severity of Alternative Sanctions Compared to 
Prison, 16 JUST. Q. 19, 19 (1999). 
 32. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 33. Brian K. Payne & Randy R. Gainey, The Electronic Monitoring of Offenders Released from 
Jail or Prison  Safety, Control, and Comparisons to the Incarceration Experience, 84 PRISON J. 413, 
416 (2004). 
 34. See infra Part II.A. While the use of GPS technology expanded the populations subject to 
EM—most notably, sex offenders—it did not fundamentally change the punitive nature of EM. 
 35. See infra Part II.B. 
 36. See infra Part II.C. 
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expansion of state control, assuming that EM is used as an added 
condition.37 
The substitution/addition distinction is also crucial to constitutional 
analysis and policy assessments of EM use in the criminal justice context. 
Since, as this Article maintains, government-imposed EM should be 
presumed to be punishment, whether a particular use of EM is 
constitutional and justifiable on policy grounds depends on whether it is 
being used as a substitute for incarceration or as an added condition.38 
Retroactive imposition of punishment is unconstitutional, and courts 
should find retroactive imposition of EM—a clear use of EM as an added 
condition—in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.39 In the pretrial context, individuals subject to EM coupled 
with house arrest—a sanction which, in the post-sentence context, may be a 
substitute for incarceration—should receive credit for time served.40 
The substitution/addition distinction also should be central to any 
policy analysis of EM use. Precisely because EM is best understood as 
serving a punitive function in the criminal justice context, policymakers 
should take steps to avoid EM creep—the unfettered expansion of criminal 
justice surveillance. Following the widespread assumption that U.S. 
sentencing is too punitive, EM should be favored in some instances as an 
alternative to incarceration, but it should be presumptively disfavored as an 
added condition. Even when used as a substitute for incarceration, 
safeguards should be introduced to avoid the financially motivated 
expansion of EM, and efforts by private companies to further expand EM 
should be resisted.41 Finally, metrics should be put in place to evaluate 
which approaches are most successful for which offender populations. 
Only then will policymakers be able to make empirically informed choices 
about the future uses of EM.42 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the origins and 
traditional use of criminal justice EM as a substitute for incarceration—a 
punitive sanction—and finds that this use can be justified by the dominant 
punishment theories. Part II highlights the bifurcation of mass monitoring 
that accompanied the introduction of GPS technology and distinguishes 
 
 37. See infra Part II.D. 
 38. See infra Part II.E. 
 39. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 40. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 41. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 42. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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between its uses as a substitute for incarceration and as an added sanction. 
It highlights the primacy of this “substitution/addition distinction,” which is 
crucial to clarifying polarized discourse around EM and has significant 
implications for punishment theory, since an added punitive sanction to an 
existing proportionate punishment would result in excessive punishment. 
Part III explores the implications of these findings for the future uses of 
EM, doctrinally in the context of allegedly non-punitive uses in the post-
sentence and pretrial stages, and practically with respect to financing EM, 
measuring results, and preventing the unfettered expansion of this 
technology. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF MASS MONITORING AS PUNISHMENT 
This Part introduces the mass monitoring phenomenon and anchors 
the Article’s discussion of EM as a punitive sanction. It first traces the use 
of EM, from early experiments with parolees through the explosion of its 
use in conjunction with house arrest as an alternative to incarceration. It 
then demonstrates that criminal justice use of EM is consistent with the 
goals of dominant punishment theories. 
A.  THE PROMISE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR 
INCARCERATION 
1.  Early Experiments and Founding Principles 
The use of EM for offenders was originally conceived as a progressive 
alternative to incarceration—even as a way to phase out the nation’s 
prisons and jails.43 In 1964, a group of Harvard researchers pioneered EM 
technology for criminal justice use.44 Using equipment measuring “6 inches 
by 3 inches by 1 inch in size” and “weigh[ing] about two pounds,” this new 
technology was used to monitor parolees in Boston and Cambridge. 45 
Participants in the experiment wore the technology on a belt and were 
required to remain within a designated monitoring area approximately 
1,000 feet from a repeater station. 46  When a participant’s transceiver 
 
 43. See, e.g., Ralph Kirkland Gable, Application of Personal Telemonitoring to Current 
Problems in Corrections, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 167, 172–73 (1986). 
 44. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 13, 19. The 
literature refers to these researchers alternately as the Schwitzgebel brothers and, after they changed 
their last names, the Gable brothers. 
 45. Gable, supra note 43, at 168. See also ANN H. CROWE ET AL., OFFENDER SUPERVISION WITH 
ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY 2 (2002). Other experimental groups included mentally ill patients and 
research volunteers. Id. 
 46. Gable, supra note 43, at 168. Accord MATT BLACK & RUSSELL G. SMITH, ELECTRONIC 
MONITORING IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (Austl. Inst. of Criminology, Trends & Issues in 
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activated the repeater station, the participant’s location would be recorded 
and displayed.47 
The researchers involved in these early experiments had high hopes 
for future use of EM in the criminal context, specifically its use as a 
favorable alternative to incarceration.48 They maintained, “[w]hen specific 
offending behaviors can be accurately predicted and/or controlled within 
the offender’s own environment, incarceration will no longer be necessary 
as a means of controlling behavior and protecting society.”49 
2.  The Growth of Radio Frequency Monitoring 
By the early 1980s, commercial EM equipment was available. 
Manufacturers pitched this new radio frequency technology as an effective 
complement to house arrest. 50  Given the severe prison overcrowding 
problems at the time, 51  states took note, and the mass monitoring 
phenomenon was born. 52  From 1986 to 1989, use of this burgeoning 
technology exploded, and the number of offenders subject to EM and house 
arrest grew by 6,700 percent.53 Sanctions that combined EM and house 
arrest were widely considered cheap, humane, and safe alternatives to 
 
Crime and Criminal Justice No. 254, 2003), http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/ 
tandi254.pdf (explaining active systems of EM). 
 47. Gable, supra note 43, at 168. 
 48. Robert Gable, Electronic Monitoring, ROBERT GABLE, https://rgable.wordpress.com/ 
electronic-monitoring-of-criminal-offenders (last visited Jan. 6, 2017). Notably, contemporaneous 
accounts, while enthusiastic, were not without some hint of concern for unchecked surveillance. See 
generally, e.g., Robert L. Schwitzgebel, A Belt from Big Brother, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Apr. 1969, at 45, 
45 (describing early EM experiments and potential future uses of the technology). Gable claimed that 
the ominous title of his article was not his choice. Gable, supra. 
 49. Ralph Schwitzgebel et al., A Program of Research in Behavioral Electronics, 9 BEHAV. SCI. 
233, 237 (1964). 
 50. James Bonta et al., Can Electronic Monitoring Make a Difference? An Evaluation of Three 
Canadian Programs, 46 CRIME & DELINQ. 61, 62 (1992). 
 51. See, e.g., Rod Smolla, Prison Overcrowding and the Courts  A Roadmap for the 1980s, 1984 
U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 402–03 (1984) (detailing some negative effects of overcrowding). 
 52. Many have traced the commercial proliferation of EM to collaboration between Schwitzgebel 
and a district court judge from New Mexico who, in the late 1970s, was inspired by a Spider-Man 
comic book to imagine “a device which monitored a person’s proximity to a base station, relaying any 
violations via telephone.” Lilly & Nellis, supra note 12, at 24–25. This technology was already used for 
non-criminal justice purposes; for example, Sears catalog stores used radio frequency technology to 
alert customers that their orders were ready. Peggy Conway, Survey of Agencies Using Electronic 
Monitoring Reveals a Promising Future, J. OFFENDER MONITORING, Summer/Fall 2003, at 5, 5. 
 53. See GAIL A. CAPUTO, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN CORRECTIONS 99 (2004) (reporting the 
increase from 95 individuals in 1986 to 6,490 in 1989). The first EM house arrest program involved ten 
male offenders in New Mexico, and within the year, counties in Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, and 
Michigan followed suit. Rolando V. del Carmen & Joseph B. Vaughn, Legal Issues in the Use of 
Electronic Surveillance in Probation, FED. PROB., June 1986, at 60, 60. 
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prison that nevertheless delivered some deserved punishment.54 
In 1987, the Florida Department of Corrections pioneered a program 
that used EM with house arrest as an alternative to incarceration.55 The 
radio frequency unit enabled officers to keep track of whether the 
individual on house arrest remained at home. According to the profile of 
this program, “[t]he equipment consists of a tamper-resistant small 
transmitter worn by the offender. The transmitter communicates with a 
small receiving unit tied into the phone landline. The receiving unit notifies 
a monitoring station if the signal is lost; if so, the probation officer is 
notified.”56 The radio frequency system “can be programmed to take work 
or religious schedules into account allowing offenders to be off-site at 
predetermined times. Officers can also use a ‘drive by’ monitoring device 
to verify the location of the offender, whether at home, at work, or in 
treatment as scheduled.”57 
Some of these radio frequency EM programs have remained virtually 
unchanged through the present day. For example, since 1989, Rhode Island 
has offered eligible offenders58 the opportunity to opt into the Community 
Confinement program,59 which consists of house arrest and radio frequency 
monitoring, instead of going to prison or jail.60 Qualifications include a 
legal residence and a landline, and a screening interview is required for 
each offender.61 
While in Community Confinement, offenders are expected to spend 
the vast majority of their time at home, though they are allowed to 
participate in “life-sustaining activities,” which include laundry and 
 
 54. See, e.g., Marc Renzema & David Skelton, Scope of Electronic Monitoring Today, J. 
OFFENDER MONITORING, Fall 1991, at 6, 7. 
 55. Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Program Profile  Electronic Monitoring (Florida), 
CRIMESOLUTIONS.GOV (Apr. 24, 2012), www.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=230. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. If the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney agree, the Department of Corrections will 
schedule an eligibility hearing. Interview with Anne D’Alessio, Home Confinement Dir., R.I. Dep’t of 
Corrections, in Cranston, R.I. (July 9, 2015). Ultimately, the judge determines whether the offender can 
join the Community Confinement program. Id. 
 59. Maryland is the only other state that offers an opt-in community confinement program for the 
entire duration of a qualified offender’s sentence. Offenders are excluded if they were charged with a 
violent crime in the previous five years, as well as if the current charge is intent to deliver illegal drugs 
(though drug possession does not exclude an offender from consideration for the program). Use of 
firearms is also an exclusionary factor. Id. 
 60. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF R.I., supra note 6, at 3–4. 
 61. If the offender will be living with someone, there is a separate interview required of that 
person. Interview with Anne D’Alessio, supra note 58. No offender is allowed to live with someone on 
active probation unless that person is a family member. Id. 
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grocery shopping.62 Participants in Community Confinement meet weekly 
or biweekly with their community counselors, each of whom supervises 
approximately fifty offenders; the offender brings a proposed schedule for 
the coming week, and the counselor approves or denies the proposed 
activities and also collects program fees.63 Once approved by the counselor, 
the written schedules provided by offenders are data entered into a 
Department of Corrections computer.64 
The program is overseen from the Community Confinement office at 
the Department of Corrections, which is centralized in Cranston, and two 
corrections officers are on call for each shift.65  During their shift, the 
officers sit in front of a computer watching for alerts.66 There are also 
random “community field visits,” often assisted by “drive-by” machines to 
detect radio frequency, ensuring that offenders are where they said they 
would be.67 If the offender is not where the offender is supposed to be, or if 
the band of the offender’s monitor has been tampered with, an alert will be 
activated in the Community Confinement program headquarters. 68  An 
offender who has been missing for thirty minutes or more is considered on 
“escape status.”69 In the case of an alert, once the situation is resolved, the 
on-duty corrections officer consults with the Community Confinement 
program supervisor about the appropriate sanction.70 
This Rhode Island example illustrates key features of radio frequency 
EM programs: monitoring technology is administered by criminal justice 
officials as a more humane alternative to prison and as a means to reduce 
prison overcrowding. The following Section scrutinizes this use of EM 
through the lens of punishment theory, finding that the use of EM as an 
alternative to incarceration comports with traditional goals of punishment. 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Random drug and alcohol testing is also administered during these visits. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. The size of Rhode Island and the centralization of its Department of Corrections—a 
single campus that houses everyone from maximum security inmates to the Community Confinement 
headquarters for the state—is unique, and the Community Confinement program benefits from these 
features. For example, this concentration of resources makes it logistically feasible for inmates to check 
in with their counselor each week. Larger states wishing to adopt this model could create multiple 
Community Confinement branches across the state. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Sanctions could range from the entry of a case management note to a warning to 
incarceration. Id. However, only the Director and Associate Director of the Community Confinement 
program are empowered to incarcerate an offender who has violated the conditions of the program. Id. 
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B.  ELECTRONIC MONITORING AS PUNISHMENT 
Both retributive and consequentialist analyses raise questions about 
how EM compares to other sanctions, particularly incarceration. While 
each person’s experience of EM (like incarceration) is unique, 71  as a 
general principle, EM should be considered less restrictive than 
incarceration.72 But this fact alone does not cut against its punitiveness. 
Especially given the surge of interest in alternatives to incarceration, it 
simply cannot be the case that anything less restrictive than incarceration is 
insufficiently punitive, for such argument would preclude the very 
possibility of alternatives to incarceration. 
If one imagines broad levels of restrictiveness, the highest level, Level 
4, is incarceration.73 The next level, Level 3, is home confinement with 
EM, which restricts one’s mobility but is widely believed to be less 
punitive than imprisonment. 74  The next level, Level 2, is home 
confinement without EM, which is obviously less restrictive as the offender 
is not required to wear a monitor, which many have reported to be 
physically painful; 75  even if the offender is subject to restrictions on 
mobility, the offender’s moment-to-moment whereabouts are not subject to 
criminal justice oversight.76 The final level, Level 1, is EM alone without 
home confinement.77 
 
 71. See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
182, 196 (2009). 
 72. See, e.g., Martin et al., supra note 12, at 567. 
 73. Of course, there are huge distinctions in levels of restrictiveness within many prisons, but that 
discussion is beyond this Article’s scope. 
 74. Some offenders, however, find EM and home confinement worse than prison. Martin et al., 
supra note 12, at 563 (reporting that, of 61 surveyed offenders from Western Pennsylvania, “28% of the 
respondents stated that they would prefer a jail sentence to [house arrest] and EM—for these 
respondents, [house arrest] was viewed as being less palatable than serving time in the local jail”). 
However, the Rhode Island experience, where every eligible offender has opted into the Community 
Confinement program, suggests that these are outliers. Perhaps this is a function of expectation bias—
people may assume that EM and home confinement will not feel especially restrictive, and when they 
experience otherwise, they become particularly malcontented. 
 75. See, e.g., Problems Plague GPS Tracking of WA Offenders, KING5.COM (Feb. 26, 2014, 
8:17 PM), http://www.king5.com/story/news/local/investigations/2014/08/05/13398446. 
 76. How much the punitive effect of monitoring is related to the physical device attached to 
one’s body versus the knowledge that one’s every movement can be recorded is a question for future 
research. 
 77. Some may argue that Level 1 is actually more restrictive than Level 2. This determination 
may vary depending on how one assesses the value of physical mobility versus that of not having one’s 
whereabouts under scrutiny. Regardless, this Article’s analysis does not hinge on the difference 
between Level 1 and Level 2. Rather, a crucial distinction is between Level 2 and Level 3. Since EM is 
experienced as restrictive and painful, there should be little doubt that the addition of EM to a 
punishment will make it more restrictive, and, thus, that Level 3 is more restrictive than Level 2. As for 
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The experience of those subject to EM and the broader social meaning 
of EM are deeply relevant to the question whether EM comports with 
punishment theory.78 This Section draws on qualitative data revealing that 
EM causes pain and unpleasantness, and may negatively affect a wearer’s 
employment prospects, family relationships, and general wellbeing. In its 
examination of how EM comports with traditional punishment theories, 
this Section will address retributive, expressive, deterrence, and 
rehabilitative theories in turn. 
1.  Electronic Monitoring as Retributive 
According to retributive theory, offenders morally deserve 
punishment, and this punishment should impose pain or unpleasantness.79 
For the retributivist, the appropriate punishment should be proportional to 
the offender’s crime.80 
The first foundational question for the retributivist is whether EM 
causes pain or unpleasantness. 81  The requirement that offenders wear 
monitors on their persons 24/7—during all waking and sleeping hours—
will strike many as objectively unpleasant, and subjective experiences 
gleaned from qualitative studies substantiate that EM imposes pain.82 One 
 
the use of EM as a substitute for incarceration, the salient distinction is between Level 4 and Level 3. 
One scholarly account, without delineating the various levels of restrictiveness, noted that “[e]lectronic 
monitoring operates as an intermediate sanction because it is less severe than imprisonment, but more 
restrictive than traditional probation.” Button et al., supra note 4, at 417. 
 78. The question whether EM use can be justified by punishment theory may be uniquely 
American. Other countries that use EM routinely make assumptions about its punitiveness. See, e.g., 
George Mair & Mike Nellis, ‘Parallel Tracks’  Probation and Electronic Monitoring in England, 
Wales and Scotland, in ELECTRONICALLY MONITORED PUNISHMENT, supra note 1, at 63, 77 (noting 
that in England and Wales, EM was adopted as a way to make probation more punitive). Accounts from 
the criminology literature also routinely conclude that EM is a punitive sanction. See, e.g., William 
Bülow, Electronic Monitoring of Offenders  An Ethical Review, 20 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 505, 514 
(2014) (asserting that EM “can be conceptualized as a form of punishment, that is, it is an intended 
deprivation (of freedom of movement) on the offender authorized by the state as a response for his or 
her criminal offense”). 
 79. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955). See also John Bronsteen, 
Retribution’s Role, 84 IND. L.J. 1129, 1129 (2009); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347 (1983). 
 80. See, e.g., RICHARD L. LIPPKE, RETHINKING IMPRISONMENT 111–12 (2007) (“The aim of 
legal punishment . . . is . . . to impose equalizing losses on [offenders] in ways consistent with 
recognizing their status as autonomous moral beings.”) 
 81. This premise appears to be taken for granted in the broader international context, where use 
of EM is debated but its punitiveness is assumed. See, e.g., Mair & Nellis, supra note 78, at 77–78. 
 82. See, e.g., BALES ET AL., supra note 12, at 89–102 (discussing the effect of EM on offenders’ 
relationships); Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 418, 421–22 tbl.1 (describing survey responses of 
forty-nine offenders on EM). See also Joan Petersilia & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, What Punishes? 
Inmates Rank the Severity of Prison vs. Intermediate Sanctions, FED. PROB., Mar. 1994, at 3, 3 
 138 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:123 
individual subject to EM explained: “The ankle bracelet is the bane of my 
every day existence. I loathe it with every pore in my body. It is unsightly, 
uncomfortable and huge.”83  Another reported that the EM device “was 
beating my ankle into a bloody pulp.” 84  Thus, the answer to the 
retributivist’s first question is that EM often does cause pain and 
unpleasantness to those who are required to wear the monitoring devices.85 
The second foundational question for retributivists is whether EM, 
with or without other punishment conditions, is proportional to a given 
offender’s crime. This is an inherently subjective and contextual 
determination. To a large extent, the proportionality of a punishment is in 
the eye of the beholder, and criminal justice norms differ across individuals 
and jurisdictions. For example, in Finland, fines are routinely used as a 
criminal punishment.86 By contrast, in the United States, there is no social 
consensus that fines are punitive.87 Importantly, because proportionality is 
context dependent, it is also malleable as underlying criminal justice norms 
evolve.88 Thus, perceptions regarding the suitability of EM as a sanction 
 
(discussing subjective perceptions of interprediate sanction programs); Peter B. Wood & Harold G. 
Grasmick, supra note 31, at 19 (finding that offenders may experience “alternative sanctions as 
significantly more punitive than imprisonment”). 
 83. Electronic Ball and Chain (Day 25), 180 DAYS ON HOUSE ARREST (Oct. 25, 2009), 
https://the180daysblog.wordpress.com/category/house-arrest/ankle-bracelet. 
 84. Problems Plague GPS Tracking of WA Offenders, supra note 75. See also Electronic Ball 
and Chain (Day 25), supra note 83 (“I am always tired since House Arrest began, I believe it is a 
combination of the random phone calls which seem to come at 5:30–6:00 AM quite often, and the 
constant, annoying, discomfort. This I also feel is a component of the sadistic punishment, sleep 
deprivation.”) 
 85. This conclusion is not meant to suggest that every offender experiences EM similarly. For 
example, one study found that “older offenders find [EM] to be more punitive than younger offenders 
do.” Brian K. Payne et al., The Pains’ of Electronic Monitoring  A Slap on the Wrist or Just as Bad as 
Prison?, 27 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 133, 145 (2014). However, this lack of uniformity does not refute 
evidence that, in the aggregate, EM is experienced as punitive. 
 86. EDWIN W. ZEDLEWSKI, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ No. 230401, 
ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODIAL SUPERVISION: THE DAY FINE 3 (2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/grants/230401.pdf (describing the history of day fines, which were first used in Finland in 1921); Joe 
Pinsker, Finland, Home of the $103,000 Speeding Ticket, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/finland-home-of-the-103000-speeding-ticket/387 
484. 
 87. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 618–19 
(1996). 
 88. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.10A cmt. b, at 59–60 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft 
No. 2, 2008), quoted in Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for 
Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 151, 171 (2014) (“On proportionality grounds, societal 
assessments of offense gravity and offender capability sometimes change over the course of a 
generation or comparable period. In recent history, . . . there has been flux in community attitudes 
toward some classes of drug offenders, and even in crime categories as serious as homicide, such as 
when a battered spouse kills an abusive husband or in cases of assisted suicide.”). 
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for a particular crime may change over time. 
To satisfy the retributivist, the specific use of EM (as well as the 
particularities of the technology) could be calibrated in accordance with the 
demands of proportionality. Punishments could vary on a number of axes: 
amount of time subject to EM, additional restrictions (for example, where 
and when the monitored person could travel), and visibility or size of the 
monitor. For example, the addition of other sanctions would make the 
aggregate effect of EM more painful (for example, EM in addition to home 
confinement as opposed to EM alone). Additionally, the size of the 
monitor, and whether the monitor is designed to be worn over or under the 
offender’s clothing, could make the punishment of EM more or less severe. 
In theory, a proportionality inquiry might require that, for some crimes, a 
large, bulky monitor should be worn over the offender’s outer layer of 
clothing while, for others, a smaller, less visible device would suffice. The 
length of time one is subject to EM should also be important to the 
retributivist. Since qualitative data suggest that EM is experienced as 
painful, each day that a person spends subject to EM is another day’s 
experience of pain and unpleasantness. 
The use of EM as a substitute for incarceration can be justified since, 
having established that EM causes the offender pain, it follows that the 
imposition of EM would be proportional to some crime or, at least, that the 
addition of EM as a component part of an offender’s sentence would be 
proportional. The remaining challenge for the retributivist is an age-old 
one: to calibrate punishment to crime.89 
Of course, the retributivist might believe that EM—even as part of a 
home confinement program—could never be a proportionate punishment 
for certain crimes, such as the particularly heinous crime of murder.90 Here 
the concern would be that the monitoring sanction is not sufficiently 
painful given the severity of the offender’s crime. But presumably the same 
retributivist would feel differently about less serious crimes, such as 
shoplifting. 
Ultimately, any effort to calibrate punishment to crime brings us back 
to default presumptions about the appropriateness of particular sanctions. If 
the default presumption is that offenders convicted of a certain crime 
should go to jail or prison, then anything less than incarceration may appear 
 
 89. Calibrating punishment to crime is inherently subjective. See Kolber, supra note 71, at 182. 
 90. See, e.g., Max Fisher, A Different Justice  Why Anders Breivik Only Got 21 Years for Killing 
77 People, ATLANTIC (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/a-
different-justice-why-anders-breivik-only-got-21-years-for-killing-77-people/261532. 
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indulgent or, at the very least, not sufficiently punitive. To the extent that 
this is the case for certain crimes in the United States, EM as substitute, 
even when used as part of a bundle of sanctions, may not satisfy the 
retributivist. By contrast, where fines are the expected punishment for 
many crimes,91 incarceration for such crimes would seem overly punitive. 
Crucially, this baseline is malleable, as are the social norms that inform it 
and are informed by it. If we were to begin punishing certain classes of 
offenders by EM or criminal fines instead of incarceration, this may at first 
seem unusual (or possibly even unfair to those who were incarcerated for 
the same behavior at a different time), but eventually it would become the 
new default presumption.92 
Determining how to weigh different sanctions based on level of 
restrictiveness, among other factors, imposes yet another subjective 
dimension. For example, California and Rhode Island both routinely 
impose EM for the duration of an offender’s sentence, but these states use 
different EM-to-incarceration ratios. California uses a 1:1 ratio (that is, a 
six-month sentence to jail would be substituted with six months of home 
confinement with EM),93 while Rhode Island employs a 2:1 ratio (that is, 
the same six-month jail sentence would be substituted with one year of 
community confinement with EM).94 These examples illustrate the lack of 
consensus regarding the EM-to-incarceration ratio and may also speak to 
the inherent subjectivity associated with the retributivist’s determination of 
proportionality. 
 
 91. Hanns von Hofer, Notes on Crime and Punishment in Sweden and Scandinavia, in ANNUAL 
REPORT FOR 1999 AND RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES NO. 57, at 283, 289 (UNAFEI ed., 2001), 
www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No57/No57_26VE_Hofer.pdf (noting that 81 percent of those 
convicted in Finland receive fines, the highest percentage of any Scandinavian country). 
 92. By analogy, over time, many behaviors that were once criminal have been legalized. 
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1070–71 (2015) 
(discussing decriminalization of marijuana in eighteen states and decriminalization of “traffic offenses, 
regulatory offenses, and urban order maintenance”). 
 93. Telephone Interview with Kevin O’Connell, Research Analyst, Probation Officers of Cal. 
(Jan. 12, 2016). 
 94. Perhaps one reason why Rhode Island settled on a 2:1 ratio is because its Community 
Confinement program was one of the very first of its kind. It was not put into place primarily because of 
budgetary concerns, so maybe there was more thought devoted to what the ideal ratio would be to 
satisfy retributive (as well as other) concerns. Or, perhaps, the ratio was chosen because of the 
widespread intuition—and documentation by offenders—that home confinement plus EM is simply less 
restrictive than prison or jail. Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 428 (“Electronic monitoring is heaven 
compared to jail. . . . I learned a very valuable lesson but house arrest is better than jail. . . . It 
was . . . not as bad as the shame of jail.”). Ultimately, there is no universal ratio, and as EM use 
continues to expand as a substitute for incarceration, it will be interesting to see whether these ratios 
become more varied or whether a 1:1 ratio becomes commonplace. 
 2017] MASS MONITORING 141 
2.  Electronic Monitoring as Expressive 
According to expressive theory, laws and their enforcement patterns 
influence social norms and send messages about the values of a society.95 
Thus, the expressivist will care especially about what message is sent by 
the use of EM as a criminal sanction. 
A classic example of expressive punishment is shaming penalties,96 
which are “explicitly designed to make a public spectacle of the offender’s 
conviction and punishment, and to trigger a negative, downward change in 
the offender’s self-concept.” 97  The expressivist might favor use of an 
electronic monitor as a shaming sanction or expression of blame 98 —a 
modern-day “scarlet letter”99—to send the message to both the offender 
and the wider community that the offender’s conduct is unacceptable and 
will be punished.100 To manifest this expression of disapproval, the monitor 
would need to be visible. 
The expressivist would condone the use of EM as a component of an 
offender’s punishment. Individuals subject to EM have described the 
monitoring devices as a source of embarrassment and shame,101 and the 
imposition of EM as a sanction can be said to send a message both to the 
offender and to society more broadly. According to one individual subject 
to EM: “It truly is the electronic version of the ball and chain, there is never 
a waking moment I am not aware of its presence on my person. The band is 
loose enough so that the box can be rotated 360 degrees, but no matter how 
you spin it . . . it is always reminding me it is there.” 102  Others have 
experienced unpleasant encounters with family members, friends, and 
 
 95. See, e.g., Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 860 (2014); 
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 949–62 (1995); Richard 
H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 339 (2000); Cass R. 
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022–23 (1996). 
 96. See, e.g., Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609, 
612 (2006); Kahan, supra note 87, at 594; James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame 
Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1061 (1998). 
 97. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 
1886 (1991). 
 98. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure  Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil 
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 803 (1997) (crediting the expressionists with bringing to light the 
role of blame in defining punishment). 
  99. See generally NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Brian Harding ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 2d ed. 2007) (1850). 
 100. Bülow, supra note 78, at 512 (considering, though ultimately rejecting, the argument that 
“the feeling of shame ascribed to the offender when he or she has to wear a device which can 
potentially be displayed is desirable, since it may foster a sense of repentance”). 
 101. See, e.g., Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 417. 
 102. Electronic Ball and Chain (Day 25), supra note 83. 
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prospective employers as a result of their EM devices,103 suggesting that 
these devices are perceived as shaming by society at large. 
3.  Electronic Monitoring as Deterrent 
The deterrence theorist will prioritize crime prevention,104 and will 
assess possible punishments using a cost-benefit analysis,105 weighing both 
positive and negative consequences of punishment. 106  Both general 
deterrence and specific deterrence are relevant to the analysis of EM and 
punishment theory.107 
For EM use to be justified by the principle of general deterrence, the 
imposition of EM must cause sufficient unpleasantness such that potential 
criminals will view that punishment as a cost they want to avoid.108 Since 
EM imposes unpleasantness—including physical pain and mental 
anguish 109 —and may adversely impact relationships with friends and 
family as well as employment prospects, 110  EM should function as a 
deterrent for prospective criminals. Of course, given that EM is less 
restrictive than incarceration,111 it cannot be said that EM would deter as 
much as the threat of incarceration. However, since an offender cannot 
realistically anticipate ex ante whether, if caught, the offender would serve 
time in jail or prison or be subject to EM, 112  or a combination, this 
restrictiveness (and deterrence) differential should not matter in practice.113 
For EM use to satisfy the principles of specific deterrence theory, 
 
 103. See, e.g., BALES ET AL., supra note 12, at 89–97 (discussing the impact of EM on offenders’ 
relationships). 
 104. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 322–24 (Charles Kay Ogden ed., F.B. 
Rothman 1931). Many have critiqued deterrence theory. See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, A Critical 
Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory, 88 DICK. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983). 
 105. Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 344 (2004). 
 106. See R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 18 (2001); Bülow, supra 
note 78, at 515. 
 107. John B. Mitchell, Crimes of Misery and Theories of Punishment, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 465, 
487–93 (2012). 
 108. This calculus must be delicately calibrated to avoid the problem of overdeterrence. See, e.g., 
Walter Olsen, Overdeterrence and the Problem of Comparative Risk, 37 PROC. ACAD. COMP. RISK 42, 
43 (1988). 
 109. See, e.g., Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 417. 
 110. See, e.g., BALES ET AL., supra note 12, at 89–97. 
 111. See Martin et al., supra note 12, at 565. 
 112. A notable exception would be if EM were imposed as a default sanction for certain crimes as 
a substitute, though this is unlikely, and a case-based determination is far more plausible. 
 113. Deterrence theory might support the use of bulky or unwieldy monitoring devices if 
necessary to deter prospective criminals. Questions of degree (both of calibrating the EM device and of 
determining the deterrent effect of EM relative to incarceration) are empirical ones that call for future 
research. 
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offenders should be deterred from reoffending because they are afraid of 
being caught. 114  Specific deterrence in this context has an almost 
“incapacitating” function. 115  The question of how effective EM is on 
specific deterrence grounds is an empirical one. Two factors crucial to the 
efficacy of EM as a specific deterrent are the technology itself and the 
people monitoring the devices.116 
Furthermore, since more than 95 percent of all incarcerated offenders 
will eventually be released,117 and since prisons and jails are known to be 
criminogenic,118 it follows that limiting offenders’ exposure to prison and 
jail may make them less predisposed to future criminal activity. 119 
Deterrence arguments support the use of EM instead of imprisoning 
offenders who do not present a significant risk to the public.120 Given the 
 
 114. An added deterrent aspect of EM is that, if offenders are caught, they will be subject to more 
punitive sanctions, namely jail or prison. Preliminary qualitative work suggests that this is part of the 
offender’s calculus: “I wouldn’t escape. That’s another charge, more time. . . . Well anyone that’s on 
the monitoring is stupid if they try to escape because they are the one that’s going to suffer 
consequences.” Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 425. 
 115. Generally, incapacitation entails removing offenders from society by either locking them up 
in jail or prison or otherwise restraining them. While incapacitation is a component of utilitarian 
punishment theory, an analysis of EM through the lens of incapacitation is not applicable: as with other 
alternatives to incarceration, EM outside of prison or jail walls by definition does not incapacitate. 
 116. Critics of EM have highlighted limitations of the technology that may minimize the 
effectiveness of the sanction. For example, a GPS device may fail to send appropriate alerts. See, e.g., 
Paige St. John, Tests Found Major Flaws in Parolee GPS Monitoring Devices, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 
2013) [hereinafter St. John, Tests Found Major Flaws], http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/30/local/la-
me-ff-gps-monitors-20130331. Or there may be many false positives. See, e.g., Mario Koran, Lost 
Signals, Disconnected Lives, WISCONSINWATCH.ORG (Mar. 24, 2013), http://wisconsinwatch.org/2013/ 
03/lost-signals-disconnected-lives. These factors may cause those tasked with responding not to take the 
alarms seriously. Additionally, critics have expressed concern that those tasked with oversight and 
response may lack proper training or may be supervising such a large number of offenders that they 
simply cannot be sufficiently responsive to all of them. See, e.g., Report  Prisons System Lacks 
Guidelines for Electronic Monitoring (Colorado Public Radio radio broadcast Aug. 31, 2014), 
http://www.cpr.org/news/audio/report-prisons-system-lacks-guidelines-electronic-monitoring; Paige St. 
John, GPS Monitoring Alerts Overwhelm Probation Officers, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2014), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/15/local/la-me-ff-gps-overload-20140216. While these are serious 
concerns, as the technology continues to improve and as resources are allocated for appropriate training 
of those overseeing EM programs, these concerns are not insurmountable. 
 117. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS & CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 711 (Mary Bosworth ed., 2005). 
 118. See generally Scott D. Camp & Gerald G. Gaes, Criminogenic Effects of the Prison 
Environment on Inmate Behavior  Some Experimental Evidence, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 425 (2005) 
(testing the intuition that prisons are criminogenic). 
 119. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 12, at 477; Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 416–17. 
 120. While the lower costs of EM as compared with prison have been discussed elsewhere, see 
infra notes 163–165 and accompanying text, it bears mentioning that the utilitarian who is concerned 
with incapacitating offenders to avoid their commission of future crimes will also be inclined to engage 
in a cost-benefit analysis. EM offers significant cost savings as compared with incarceration, which 
should make it more attractive to the utilitarian. 
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high level of risk-aversion of parole agents and other criminal justice 
stakeholders, 121  many of these low-risk offenders would otherwise be 
incarcerated if not for the availability of EM technology.122 Indeed, the 
availability of EM technology should inspire criminal justice leaders to 
think carefully about the distinction between those who present a high risk 
to the public, and therefore should be subject to the highest level of 
restraint (that is, prison), and those whose risk factors do not rise to that 
level and should instead be subject to a lower level of restrictiveness (for 
example, EM with or without home confinement).123 
4.  Electronic Monitoring as Rehabilitative 
The theorist whose priority is rehabilitation will care most about the 
offender’s eventual ability to reintegrate into society. 124  One who is 
rehabilitated will not recidivate, so rehabilitative principles would demand 
that an offender avoid criminogenic environments while gaining access to 
whatever treatment, educational, or vocational programs would aid in that 
person’s reintegration. Other factors that may facilitate reentry include 
maintaining close ties with the offender’s family and community.125 The 
use of EM as a substitute for incarceration could allow the offender to 
maintain these relationships while avoiding the criminogenic prison or jail 
environment. 
Crucially, EM is not inherently rehabilitative. 126  EM at best is a 
facilitating device127—a tool that can be used as part of a “rehabilitation-
rollout,” which might include cognitive-behavioral treatment, educational 
 
 121. Telephone Interview with Patricia Caruso, Former Dir., Mich. Dep’t of Corrections (July 15, 
2014). 
 122. Of course, the same could be true of those convicted of more serious crimes—for example, 
sex offenders in Michigan, who would have remained incarcerated (rather than released on parole) if 
not for the option of EM. Id. 
 123. While it would be foolhardy to consider EM and incarceration as the only two options, EM 
provides an alternative sanction that can achieve specific deterrence goals while also avoiding the 
criminogenic environment of prison. 
 124. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 407–
10 (1958). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Bülow, supra note 78, at 516. 
 127. Perhaps the best argument that there is something inherently rehabilitative about EM is less 
about the device itself and more about “show[ing] offenders that society is placing trust back into 
them.” Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 416. Arguably, this is also an expressive justification for the 
use of EM as a substitute for incarceration, specifically in the early release context. Randy R. Gainey et 
al., The Relationships Between Time in Jail, Time on Electronic Monitoring, and Recidivism  An Event 
History Anlaysis of a Jail-Based Program, 17 JUST. Q. 733, 748 (2000) (“[J]ail incarceration followed 
by electronic monitoring affords offenders respect by trusting them with early release into the 
community.”). 
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programming, or vocational training.128 One whose priority is rehabilitation 
would thus insist that EM use was part of a program tailored toward reentry 
rather than mere incapacitation. A preliminary study suggests that, when 
EM is used as part of such a tailored program, offenders experience EM as 
rehabilitative. 129  Nearly 95 percent of a study of forty-nine offenders 
“agree[d]” or “strongly agree[d]” that the EM sanction, when part of a 
rehabilitation rollout, “helps in treating offenders by maintaining close 
supervision, may be effective because the offender can still work, may be 
effective because the offender can maintain contact with his or her family, 
and may be effective because the offender can help with his or her 
household duties.”130 Unlike the expressivist or the deterrence theorist, one 
whose priority is rehabilitation should also prefer that the EM device not be 
large, unwieldy, or uncomfortable; if the goal is successful reentry into 
mainstream society, a less stigmatic and more discreet monitor should be 
favored. 
II.  THE NEW MASS MONITORING AND THE 
SUBSTITUTION/ADDITION DISTINCTION 
The introduction of GPS technology, which allows for 24/7 
supervision of offenders, both expanded and complicated EM’s role as a 
burgeoning alternative to incarceration. This Part first highlights the 
expansion of EM use as an alternative to incarceration to new offender 
subpopulations. It then introduces the substitution/addition distinction, 
discussing the novel use of EM as an added sanction. This distinction 
between the use of EM as a substitute for incarceration and its use as an 
added sanction clarifies conflicting rhetoric surrounding the criminal 
justice use of EM and has significant implications for punishment theory. 
If, as Part I maintains, criminal justice use of EM should be characterized 
as punitive, EM’s use as a substitute for incarceration is justifiable, while 
its use as an added sanction to an existing, proportionate punishment 
cannot be justified. 
 
 
 128. For example, a study of “high-risk offenders supervised with an electronic monitoring 
device” found that these offenders “had a greater likelihood of completing treatment,” and that “the 
interaction between these two interventions—cognitive-behavioral treatment and electronic 
monitoring—reduced recidivism.” Button et al., supra note 4, at 418. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 423. 
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A.  GPS AND THE EXPANSION OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING TO NEW 
POPULATIONS 
By the late 1990s, a new monitoring technology entered the 
corrections scene. 131  GPS technology, which relies on a network of 
satellites to provide accurate location and time information, was originally 
designed for military use by the U.S. Department of Defense but was soon 
appropriated for use by telephone companies and corrections 
departments.132 In 1998, forty individuals were subject to criminal justice 
supervision via GPS monitoring systems.133 Within two years, the number 
had increased to six hundred.134 
EM’s continued and expanded use as a substitute for incarceration is 
consonant with traditional EM use and envisions EM as a favorable 
alternative to incarceration on fiscal and humanitarian axes. For example, 
GPS technology has been embraced in California as a component of 
“realignment,” the state’s plan to reduce prison overcrowding. 135 
California’s realignment legislation resulted from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ruling in 2011 that California’s prisons were unconstitutionally 
overcrowded.136 California has realigned thousands of state offenders to 
local jails, and EM has been used with respect to a broad array of offenders 
as a substitute for incarceration.137 Eligible offenders are classified as part 
of the “three nons” category: their crimes are characterized as nonviolent, 
nonsexual, and nonserious.138 Offenders who fall into this category might 
serve their entire sentence in jail, or they might serve a split sentence (that 
 
 131. Scott Vollum & Chris Hale, Electronic Monitoring  A Research Review, CORRECTIONS 
COMPENDIUM, July 2002, at 1, 1. 
 132. Marc Renzema, How the Global Positioning System Works, J. OFFENDER MONITORING, 
Spring 1998, at 8, 8 (describing as the primary Defense Department goal to use GPS technology to 
locate downed soldiers and missile silos). 
 133. Marc Renzema, Tracking GPS  A Third Look, J. OFFENDER MONITORING, Spring 2000, at 6, 
6. 
 134. Id. While GPS monitoring grew quickly in popularity, it did not immediately replace radio 
frequency technology. According to a 2003 report, at that point radio frequency technology was still the 
dominant monitoring technology, used for almost 90 percent of criminal justice uses of EM. Conway, 
supra note 52, at 21. Some states, such as Rhode Island, made the decision not to switch to GPS 
technology (at least in the community confinement context), preferring the lower-cost, less privacy-
intrusive radio frequency technology. Interview with Anne D’Alessio, supra note 58 (explaining that, 
for the Community Confinement program, this more “intrusive” technology was “unnecessary”). 
 135. Telephone Interview with Kevin O’Connell, supra note 93. 
 136. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011). 
 137. Telephone Interview with Kevin O’Connell, supra note 93. 
 138. Id.; Chief Probation Officers of Cal., Public Safety Realignment—What Is It?, CPOC ISSUE 
BRIEF, Summer 2012, at 1, 1, http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/public%20safety%20 
realignment%20brief%201.pdf. 
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is, part of their sentence in jail and part of it on EM), or they might serve 
their entire sentence on EM.139 For whatever portion of their sentence they 
serve on EM, they receive that amount of credit for time served—a 1:1 
ratio of EM to incarceration.140 
With the advent of GPS, EM was no longer inextricably connected to 
an offender’s home. Rather, it provided a means to identify the specific 
whereabouts of an offender 24/7 and to create zones of inclusion and 
exclusion. Accordingly, the archetypal example of EM coupled with house 
arrest gave way to new archetypes and offender populations. For example, 
in the pretrial context, an experimental program in Indiana used EM as an 
alternative to pretrial detention for offenders who could not afford bail.141 
Such programs have continued to grow, as cost savings of using EM as an 
alternative to pretrial detention are substantial. In Seminole County, 
Florida, “releasing suspects on bond with electronic monitoring as a 
condition has resulted in savings of more than $948,000 by not housing 
people in the jail at a cost of $80 per day.”142 
EM use also was expanded to offender subpopulations that historically 
were not eligible for EM—most notably, those convicted of sex offenses,143 
a uniquely vilified category of offenders.144 GPS monitoring was appealing 
in the sex offender context both because it allowed 24/7 supervision of 
offenders and because it facilitated the enforcement of exclusion zones 
where an offender was forbidden to travel. For example, sex offenders 
routinely are prohibited from traveling within a certain distance of schools 
or parks, and GPS technology can be programmed to set off an alarm that 
would alert corrections staff if an offender has violated these travels 
 
 139. Telephone Interview with Kevin O’Connell, supra note 93. These decisions differ by county, 
and no aggregate statistics are currently available. Collecting comprehensive survey data from this 
“natural experiment” is a subject for future research. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Michael G. Maxfield & Terry L. Baumer, Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring  
Comparing Pretrial and Postconviction Programs, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 521, 522–23 (1990). 
 142. Elyssa Cherney, Lingering Questions over GPS Monitoring Delay Action, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (June 22, 2015, 5:52 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-gps-orange-county-
courts-20150622-story.html (reporting on a six-year period from 2009 through 2015). 
 143. Darren Gowen, Remote Location Monitoring—A Supervision Strategy to Enhance Risk 
Control, FED. PROB., Sept. 2001, at 38, 40. 
 144. See, e.g., Karen Harrison, Preface to MANAGING HIGH-RISK SEX OFFENDERS IN THE 
COMMUNITY, at xvii, xvii (Karen Harrison ed., 2010); Kelly K. Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Offender Laws 
and Prevention of Sexual Violence or Recidivism, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 412, 412 (2010); Editorial, 
Do Sex Offenders Deserve a Scarlet Letter on Their Passport?, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-0203-sex-offenders-20160203-story.html (discussing 
the vilification of sex offenders in reference to a congressional proposal to mark the passports of some 
sex offenders post-sentence so they would be identifiable while traveling abroad). 
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restrictions.145 
Especially in the context of parole, some states have used GPS 
monitoring of sex offenders as a substitute for incarceration. For example, 
in Michigan, the Parole Board historically was reluctant to release eligible 
sex offenders, but it changed course once promised that these parolees 
would be subject to GPS monitoring. In 2003, Michigan’s prison system 
housed 17,000 sex offenders who had passed their earliest release date; 
these prisoners were legally eligible for parole yet were routinely denied it. 
At that time, the parole rate in Michigan for sex offenders was 11 
percent.146 Patricia Caruso, the newly appointed Director of Michigan’s 
Department of Corrections, believed that this rate could increase if she 
managed to stratify sex offenders to separate out “who we’re angry at from 
who we’re actually afraid of.”147 Central to this strategy was a $10 million 
investment in GPS technology. 
EM helped to drastically reduce the population of sex offenders in 
prison. Under the “new regime” that Caruso oversaw, 100 percent of 
paroled sex offenders would be on active GPS monitoring. Caruso 
restructured parole supervision so there would be “sex offender specialists” 
with special training.148  By 2011, when Caruso left the Department of 
Corrections, the parole rate for sex offenders had increased to 50 
percent.149 Caruso described the “peace of mind” that EM provided, which 
enabled the parole board to become more comfortable with the idea of 
granting parole to sex offenders.150 Notably, none of these parolees was 
convicted for another sex offense.151 
B.  THE USE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING AS AN ADDED SANCTION 
Beyond the use of GPS monitoring as a substitute for incarceration, 
the introduction of GPS technology into the criminal justice sphere resulted 
in a spike of novel uses of EM as an addition—an added condition for 
individuals who are no longer subject to probation or parole (what is 
colloquially referred to as “off paper”).152 The use of EM as an added 
 
 145. See Jonathan J. Wroblewski, ReSTART  GPS, Offender Reentry, and a New Paradigm for 
Determinate Sentencing, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 314, 315 (2008). 
 146. Telephone Interview with Patricia Caruso, supra note 121. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. Caruso also explained that she would not have guessed how effective and successful GPS 
technology would be, recounting that many employers were open to working with people on parole. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Lost Voices  The Civic and Political Views of 
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condition—rather than as a way to reduce prison overcrowding, save 
money, or promote rehabilitation—has been particularly prevalent in the 
sex offender context. For example, in 2005, Florida lawmakers enacted the 
Jessica Lunsford Act, which included the provision that certain sex 
offenders would be subject to GPS monitoring for life.153 This means that, 
in Florida, after some offenders complete their sentences and would 
otherwise be released from criminal justice purview, they remain subject to 
EM for the rest of their lives. The Florida law neither provides for 
individual assessment nor allows review based on documentation of 
changed circumstances.154 Many states have followed Florida’s lead and 
require sex offenders to be electronically monitored for some amount of 
time post-sentence.155 In twelve states, some sex offenders are subject to 
lifetime GPS monitoring.156 
This additive use of EM represents a striking departure from the 
traditional conception of EM as well as from its prior uses. When EM is 
used as an added condition—or collateral consequence 157 —it imposes 
additional costs but does not aid in reducing imprisonment.158 This additive 
use thus runs counter to the founding principles of EM: to reduce and 
eventually eliminate the need for prisons and jails. Yet these uses of EM as 
an added condition are imposed on persons by virtue of their having been 
brought into the criminal justice system, and they arguably have the same 
social meaning associated with punishment as does EM when used as a 
substitute for incarceration.  
The new mass monitoring can best be understood as bifurcated—used 
either as a substitute or as an added condition—and it demands an analytic 
approach that takes these two distinct uses into account. As the next 
Section illustrates, disaggregating the uses of EM as substitute and addition 
helps to clarify discourse and reconcile competing claims about mass 
monitoring. 
 
Disenfranchised Felons, in IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION, 
supra note 9, at 165, 182. 
 153. Jessica Lunsford Act, 2005 FLA. LAWS ch. 28 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
FLA. STAT.). 
 154. See id. 
 155. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207 (2016). 
 156. See supra note 8. 
 157. For a general discussion of collateral consequences, see Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating 
the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 258 (2004). 
 158. That is, it does not substitute the sanction of incarceration with the sanction of EM. However, 
the use of EM as an addition potentially could reduce recidivism through deterrence and incapacitation, 
thus reducing imprisonment overall. Studies of the recidivism-reduction effect of EM, however, are 
inconclusive. See infra notes 292–297 and accompanying text. 
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C.  MASS MONITORING RHETORIC 
Criminal justice use of EM has generated polarized reactions. 
Supporters stress the cost savings associated with EM as well as its 
rehabilitative potential. Detractors focus on the intrusiveness of EM, 
expressing concerns about a net-widening effect, that EM use will 
significantly expand the purview of the criminal justice system and the 
number of individuals subject to government surveillance. 159  These 
conflicting claims are premised on an understanding of EM as a unitary, 
theoretical concept that is either a wholly positive or wholly negative 
criminal justice development. 
This Article rejects this dominant approach, identifying EM instead as 
a tool that has many specific functions, and demonstrates that this 
disaggregated approach enables a more nuanced understanding of the 
varied uses of EM in the criminal justice system and can help to reconcile 
competing normative claims. 160  Central to this preferred disaggregated 
approach is the substitution/addition distinction: whether EM is used as an 
added condition to an existing sanction or as a substitute for incarceration. 
Indeed, closer scrutiny reveals that supporters of EM tend to assume its use 
is as a substitute for incarceration, while those opposed to EM tend to 
assume its use is in addition to an already proportionate punishment, and 
thus is both unnecessary and excessive. The substitution/addition 
distinction helps to clarify these conflicting reactions to the expansion of 
EM, illustrating that these reactions are largely predicated on distinct 
notions of what this expansion entails, what populations will be monitored, 
and whether modern uses of EM comport with founding principles. While 
it is not always possible to know for certain whether EM is being used as 
an addition or substitution, the inquiry itself is crucial and often provides 
persuasive evidence of how a particular use of EM relates to criminal 
justice ends. 
1.  Support for Electronic Monitoring Use as a Substitute 
Supporters of criminal justice EM tend to assume, whether explicitly 
or implicitly, that it is used as a substitute for incarceration. In the face of 
severely (and even unconstitutionally) 161  overcrowded prisons (and 
 
 159. Bonta et al., supra note 50, at 71–73. 
 160. Scholarly accounts of EM have tended to approach the technology as a concept rather than as 
a tool, thus blurring EM’s many distinct criminal justice uses. See, e.g., Bülow, supra note 78, at 506 
(analyzing concerns about privacy, stigmatization, and equity without disaggregating the many uses of 
EM). Such abstract assessments are of limited help to legal and policy debates about EM use. 
 161. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011) (holding that California’s prisons were 
 2017] MASS MONITORING 151 
immigration centers) and state budget deficits, these supporters have lauded 
EM as a partial solution.162 Proponents point to significant cost savings that 
result from monitoring offenders rather than incarcerating them. 163 
Estimates show that, including personnel costs, monitoring an individual 
with a second-by-second GPS system costs approximately $20 per day.164 
This is compared to $30 to $150 daily for incarceration.165 
In addition to significant cost savings, proponents of EM point to the 
social benefits of interfering less dramatically with offenders’ family 
structures, again assuming that the alternative is prison or jail. 166 
 
unconstitutionally overcrowded). 
 162. Early proponents of criminal justice use of surveillance technology included prison 
abolitionists who envisioned the future use of EM as the catalyst to “empty the world’s prisons.” E.g., 
Ralph K. Schwitzgebel, Behavioral Electronics Could Empty the World’s Prisons, FUTURIST, Apr. 
1970, at 59, 59–60. Many pilot EM programs have been instituted with the central goal of reducing 
prison overcrowding. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554d (2016) (“The goal of the pilot program 
is to assist policymakers in determining whether electronically monitored home detention and home 
confinement can be utilized . . . to save valuable bed space for detainees and inmates who . . . would 
otherwise be lodged in a correctional facility.”).  
 163. E.g., Brian K. Payne & Randy R. Gainey, Attitudes Toward Electronic Monitoring Among 
Monitored Offenders and Criminal Justice Students, 29 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 195, 196 (1999). 
Others have pointed out the “opportunity cost” associated with public spending on prisons since 
“resources directed to prisons could have been directed instead to another area of criminal justice, or to 
education or health.” Jones, supra note 12, at 477. However, to the extent that EM is used as an 
addition, states will end up paying more per offender and will need to employ more individuals to 
monitor those subject to EM. See Button et al., supra note 4, at 419 (“There may not be enough time or 
financial resources for officers to accomplish all of the necessary duties to adequately manage a 
growing population of parolees with electronic monitoring.”). 
 164. Stuart S. Yeh, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Reducing Crime Through Electronic Monitoring of 
Parolees and Probationers, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 1090, 1091 (2010). 
 165. Natasha Alladina, The Use of Electronic Monitoring in the Alaska Criminal Justice System  
A Practical Yet Incomplete Alternative to Incarceration, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 125, 144 n.136 (2011); 
David Ovalle, Plan to Release Low-Level Miami-Dade Inmates on GPS Monitors to Save over $1 
Million a Year, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 30, 2014, 7:14 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/ 
community/miami-dade/article1985206.html. Another study concluded that pretrial detention costs 
more than four times the cost of EM per day. See also Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, Pretrial 
Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, FED. PROB., Sept. 2009, at 3, 6 (reporting that the average cost of 
pretrial detention was $19,000 per defendant, compared to the average daily cost of EM, which was 
between $3,100 and $4,600). 
 166. See, e.g., Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 429 (“I feel fortunate to be back in my 
family. . . . I’ve been able to help my mother tremendously with household duties and yard work.”); 
Matthew J. Kucharson, Note, GPS Monitoring  A Viable Alternative to the Incarceration of Nonviolent 
Criminals in the State of Ohio, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV 637, 639 (2006). But see James Kilgore, Progress 
or More of the Same? Electronic Monitoring and Parole in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 21 CRITICAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 123, 129 (2013) (noting that EM can strain familial relationships). A survey funded by 
the Department of Justice found that 89 percent of probation officers believed that “offenders’ 
relationships with their significant others changed as a result of being placed on EM.” BALES ET AL., 
supra note 12, at 92. Both officers and those monitored observed that the ankle band had a distinct 
impact on children. As one parent testified, “When it beeps, the kids worry about whether the probation 
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Supporters also stress that EM may enable an offender to pursue an 
education167 or to remain employed,168 which can provide many benefits, 
including to the offender’s dependents.169 These advantages hearken back 
to the early visions of EM as a progressive, humane alternative to 
incarceration. 
2.  Criticism of Electronic Monitoring Use as an Addition 
Detractors tend to assume that EM will be used as an added condition 
and have decried the increased use of this technology as an invasive and 
inhumane expansion of the power and reach of the criminal justice system. 
Indeed, much of the criticism of EM has focused on the “increased state 
control” that it may engender 170  and is based on an (often implicit) 
 
officer is coming to take me to jail. The kids run for it, when it beeps.” Id. at 90. Another noted that his 
child “straps a watch around his ankle to be like daddy.” Id. 
 167. See, e.g., John C. Rapone, Note, Thinking Outside of the Box  Why Prisons Are Only Part of 
the Solution, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 128, 149 (2013) (emphasizing that EM can provide 
opportunities for rehabilitation that include education and support from family and friends); Boone Cty. 
Cmty. Corrections, GPS Monitoring, BOONE CTY. IND., http://boonecounty.in.gov/Default.aspx? 
tabid=442 (last visited Jan. 6, 2017) (noting that, as part of the Boone County EM program, 
“[o]ffenders without a GED or high school diploma . . . will be encouraged to complete their GED”). 
 168. See, e.g., Inka Wennerberg, High Level of Support and High Level of Control  An Efficient 
Swedish Model of Electronic Monitoring?, in ELECTRONICALLY MONITORED PUNISHMENT, supra note 
1, at 113, 119. However, while EM could be used to facilitate employment, offenders subject to EM 
have complained about significant obstacles due to requirements associated with EM. One advised that 
the Maryland Department of Corrections should allow offenders to schedule their day so they can 
preserve time to search for jobs, questioning the wisdom of extensive restrictions regarding time outside 
the home for someone already wearing a GPS monitor. Put simply, “I’m on GPS; why are you asking 
where I’m at?” James Kilgore, Shawn Harris Advice to MDOC on Electronic Monitoring, YOUTUBE 
(Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pIauXw100ys. One individual who had 
experienced EM reflected on the challenges associated with seeking or maintaining a job while on EM: 
“A good eighty, ninety percent of [employers] will have a problem” with an interviewee arriving under 
EM; “if they know you’re under that monitoring system, you’re pretty much—you know you’re not 
going to get that job.” James Kilgore, Shawn Harris Talks About Finding a Job on GPS, YOUTUBE 
(Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yeKk1jJyMI. An attorney representing a company 
that declined to hire an applicant on EM explained that the applicant’s “two-hour application process 
was disrupted four to six times by his GPS device,” “indicat[ing] a high level of potential for disruption 
in any assignment where the applicant could be placed.” Koran, supra note 116 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 169. See, e.g., Edna Erez et al., Electronic Monitoring of Domestic Violence Cases—A Study of 
Two Bilateral Programs, FED. PROB., June 2004, at 15, 16, 18. But see Kilgore, supra note 166, at 129–
31 (noting that EM can make it difficult to find employment). While the Danish criminal justice system 
is different in many respects from that of the United States, a study in Denmark reported that offenders 
who were monitored while remaining gainfully employed were less likely to be dependent on state 
benefits when compared to their incarcerated counterparts. Lars Højsgaard Andersen & Signe Hald 
Andersen, Losing the Stigma of Incarceration  Does Serving a Sentence with Electronic Monitoring 
Causally Improve Post-Release Labor Market Outcomes? 24 (Rockwood Found. Research Unit & 
Univ. Press of S. Den., Study Paper No. 40, 2012). 
 170. See Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, 20 CRIME & JUST. 99, 122 
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assumption that EM is being used as an added condition.171 This concern is 
particularly salient in the pretrial context, when defendants are presumed 
innocent and would, in the absence of EM, be released either on their own 
recognizance or after posting bail (and without any additional 
restrictions).172 
Critics have also raised concerns that EM could eventually replace 
traditional probation. 173  According to one detractor, “the question that 
arises is less ‘why would the state want to remotely monitor and manage 
offenders’ locations?’ and more ‘why would it not?’”174 Implicit in this 
observation is the concern that, unlike prisons, monitoring costs are so 
minimal that there may be little reason for states to reduce the imposition 
that EM makes on the freedom of disenfranchised groups. 
Private companies—including private prisons—increasingly are 
investing in monitoring technology,175 which has given rise to concerns 
 
(1996) (citing an EM program in Arizona that was originally created to provide early release for low-
level offenders, but, due to the reluctance of parole boards to approve inmates for eligibility and a rate 
of technical violations two times the rate for ordinary parolees, became a way to exercise more stringent 
controls over inmates than would have been previously possible); Molly Carney, Note, Correction 
Through Omniscience  Electronic Monitoring and the Escalation of Crime Control, 40 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 279, 294 (2012). 
 171. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 170, at 296; Wiseman, supra note 13, at 1376–77. U.S. criminal 
justice norms with respect to EM vary considerably from those of some European, and particularly 
Scandinavian, countries. For example, in Greece, EM is viewed as excessively punitive for any criminal 
justice purpose and has been categorically prohibited. Mike Nellis, Understanding the Electronic 
Monitoring of Offenders in Europe  Expansion, Regulation and Prospects, 62 CRIME, L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 489, 496 (2014). In Sweden, some probation (and prison) officers “thought that EM was 
inhumane and represented an unacceptable intrusion in the life of offenders, inconsistent with basic 
probation values.” Mike Nellis & Jan Bungerfeldt, Electronic Monitoring and Probation in Sweden and 
England and Wales  Comparative Policy Developments, 60 PROB. J. 278, 283 (2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 172. See Burns, supra note 3, at 88 (citing arguments from organizations such as the ACLU). Of 
course, EM in this context is used as a condition of bail, which raises the question: if not for the 
possibility of EM, would the suspect have been given the option of money bail, or would the suspect 
otherwise have been detained? 
 173. See Elizabeth D. Chicknavorian, Note, House Arrest  A Viable Alternative to the Current 
Prison System, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 53, 59–60 (1990). 
 174. Mike Nellis, Surveillance-Based Compliance Using Electronic Monitoring, in WHAT WORKS 
IN OFFENDER COMPLIANCE 143, 161 (Pamela Ugwudike & Peter Raynor eds., 2013). 
 175. Private industry stakeholders have begun adapting to changing times by investing in 
surveillance, reentry, non-criminal detention, and probation, “looking at all streams to generate 
revenue” and pursuing the “grow or die” strategy. Avlana K. Eisenberg, Incarceration Incentives in the 
Decarceration Era, 69 VAND. L. REV. 71, 119 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he GEO 
Group recently acquired Behavioral Interventions, a GPS monitoring company,” and “[i]n 2009, 
Behavioral Interventions signed a five-year, $372 million contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) to monitor nearly 30,000 immigrants awaiting asylum or deportation hearings.” Id. 
at 119–21. For private prison companies, an investment in monitoring is a means of diversification in 
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about potential conflicts of interest due to companies’ financial incentives 
to monitor and incarcerate more people. Private sector investment in EM 
technology thus contributes to the broader narrative of the “commercial 
corrections complex.”176 Critics have described the system as “runn[ing] 
non-stop like a hamster wheel . . . it goes round and round and round and 
everybody’s gettin’ their money.”177 
In the pretrial context, EM detractors have expressed concern that as 
private corporations continue to enter the market for EM technology, they 
may lobby to add GPS as a default condition of pretrial release, even when 
the suspect is non-dangerous, presents minimal flight risk, and has posted 
bail.178 These concerns are not unfounded; for example, in August 2014, a 
“tracker program” was instituted in Columbia, South Carolina, and during 
the program’s first year, judges “made [EM] a condition of bond hundreds 
of times, often for minor traffic violations or low-level misdemeanors.”179 
For the private sector, EM as substitute and EM as addition represent 
two separate markets where growth is possible, so manufacturers likely will 
pursue both. However, especially where the EM provider is also a private 
prison company, the provider has far more to gain from selling EM for use 
as an added condition; for example, EM providers may prefer that EM is 
used as a default pretrial sanction and that more individuals are subject to 
lifetime EM upon completion of their sentences. Thus, concerns about the 
private-sector influence on the growth of EM are particularly salient when 
EM is used as an added condition. 
 
the face of commitments by states to reduce their prison populations. See id. at 121. G4S, which 
monitors “more than 50,000 people in 15 countries,” advertises that they offer “a robust alternative to 
expensive prison custody for offenders who are deemed suitable for tagging.” Electronic Tagging 
Changes Needed to Save Money,’ BBC NEWS, (Sept. 24, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-19692306. 
 176. J. Robert Lilly & Richard A. Ball, Selling Justice  Will Electronic Monitoring Last?, 20 N. 
KY. L. REV. 505, 529–30 (1993). 
 177. James Kilgore, “You Just Turned My Family’s House into Another Cell,” VOICE 
MONITORED (Aug. 11, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://voiceofthemonitored.com/ 
2013/08/11/you-just-turned-my-familys-house-into-another-cell. 
 178. See, e.g., ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 63 
(2010); J. Robert Lilly, An Overview on Electronic Monitoring  The United States and Britain 1988, in 
THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF OFFENDERS 5, 5 (Ken Russell & J. Robert Lilly eds., 1989) (noting 
“the development in the US of an increasingly significant number of private corporations organized to 
offer ‘tagging’ services to an expanding market”). 
 179. Eric Markowitz, Chain Gang 2.0  If You Can’t Afford This GPS Ankle Bracelet, You Get 
Thrown in Jail, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015, 7:55 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/chain-gang-20-
if-you-cant-afford-gps-ankle-bracelet-you-get-thrown-jail-2065283. 
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D.  THE BASELINE PROBLEM 
While the use of EM at each stage in the criminal justice process 
presents discrete analytical problems, whether EM is imposed as an added 
condition to or a substitute for incarceration is the most salient distinction 
within each of these categories. So how can one best determine the specific 
function of a particular EM use? Doing so requires asking the following 
question: What would be the alternative to EM use? 
This question is germane to each of the five potential criminal justice 
uses of EM, and the specific inquiries are as follows: 
 Pretrial: In the absence of EM, would the person be detained or be 
released on personal recognizance or money bail?180 
 Probation: In the absence of EM, would the person be incarcerated 
or released on probation, though not subject to EM? 
 Community confinement: In the absence of EM, would the person 
be incarcerated or subject to house arrest without EM? 
 Parole: In the absence of EM, would the person be incarcerated or 
paroled without EM? 
 Post-sentence: In the absence of EM, would the person be civilly 
confined or subject to no criminal justice oversight? 
Depending on the context of EM use and, specifically, what sanction 
would attach if EM were not available, assessments of whether EM is cost 
saving, net-widening, or otherwise justifiable according to various 
principles will differ substantially. 
Importantly, until the advent of GPS technology, the question of 
whether EM was used as a substitute or added condition was a nonissue, as 
EM was used exclusively as a substitute. Yet there are now plentiful 
examples of EM use as substitute and added condition, often by the same 
state—for example, California. In some instances, these uses are 
unambiguous and easily distinguishable. 
GPS technology was first used by the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation in the early 2000s as an added condition: to 
monitor sex offenders post-sentence.181 This use of EM is an archetypal 
example of EM as an added condition. Since the offender, post-sentence, is 
technically no longer subject to criminal justice supervision, the imposition 
of EM at this stage is unambiguously an added condition rather than a 
 
 180. Notably, money bail could be more or less stringent than EM depending on how high bail is 
set and whether the offender is required to pay for EM. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 181. See Telephone Interview with Kevin O’Connell, supra note 93. 
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substitute. Of course, if the individual would otherwise be civilly confined, 
then EM could be understood as a less restrictive substitute for civil 
confinement. Otherwise, however, this use clearly constitutes an added 
condition. 
Other uses of EM in California are unambiguously a substitute for 
incarceration. Since the 2011 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Plata, 
which mandated that California address its prison overcrowding problem, 
and the resulting realignment scheme designed to comply with the court’s 
order, EM has been used for a broad array of offenders as a substitute for 
incarceration.182 For whatever portion of their sentence they serve on EM, 
offenders receive that amount of credit for time served, a 1:1 ratio of EM to 
incarceration. The 1:1 ratio of EM to incarceration represents the most 
archetypal use of EM as a substitute. 
For a contrasting example of EM as a substitute at the post-conviction 
stage, recall that in Rhode Island, eligible post-conviction offenders can opt 
into a community confinement program, where they are subject to radio 
frequency monitoring, instead of going to prison or jail.183 The duration of 
an offender’s stay in Community Confinement is based on a 2:1 ratio: 
twice the length of the prison term the offender received.184 So while the 
same offender profile in California and Rhode Island might serve the 
entirety of a sentence in the community subject to EM, that offender would 
be subject to criminal justice surveillance for twice the amount of time in 
Rhode Island.185 Nonetheless, Rhode Island’s use of EM still fits squarely 
within the substitution framework (although the 2:1 ratio raises questions 
about what ratio of EM to incarceration is most defensible). 
These are the easy cases. But what about borderline cases where EM 
is neither obviously a substitute nor an addition? Recall the Michigan 
parole example, where the use of EM helped to reduce drastically the 
population of sex offenders in prison by increasing the parole rate from 11 
percent to 50 percent.186 In that example, once EM was included as part of 
parole, offenders were released from prison earlier than they otherwise 
 
 182. See supra notes 135–140 and accompanying text. 
 183. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF R.I., supra note 6, at 8. 
 184. Interview with Anne D’Alessio, supra note 58. 
 185. Notwithstanding the 2:1 ratio, virtually every eligible offender has opted for the Community 
Confinement program. Id. D’Alessio explained the reasons an eligible offender might not opt to 
participate: (1) the offender has no money for a phone line or (2) the offender has problems at home and 
no other place to stay. Id. For those individuals who were unable to afford a phone line, the Rhode 
Island Department of Corrections has provided a payment plan after the offender’s release. Id. 
 186. Telephone Interview with Patricia Caruso, supra note 121. 
 2017] MASS MONITORING 157 
would have been. EM thus functioned in this context as a substitute for 
incarceration. However, one could imagine an analogous situation in which 
EM functioned as an added condition. Suppose the counterfactual scenario 
where, in the absence of the EM option, the offenders eligible for parole in 
Michigan would have been released anyway. In that case, the imposition of 
EM would be better understood as an added condition. 
To assess whether EM in a particular context is used as a substitute or 
added condition, one must first know to what sanction the offender would 
be subject if not for the availability of EM technology. This presents a 
potential baseline problem at every stage in the criminal justice process. 
Ultimately, proper characterization of a given use of EM is a tall order 
since it may not always be obvious to what sanction the offender would 
have been subject if not for the availability of EM technology. Answering 
this question might require asking decisionmakers, who may not 
themselves know, what they would have done if the EM technology were 
not available. Or it might require speculating about what decisionmakers 
would have done based on how restrictive sanctions were for a given crime 
in the past. An inquiry into this baseline may be pivotal for analytical 
purposes, but it is also highly manipulable. Still, in many instances one can 
derive some clarity by examining how EM is used more broadly in a 
particular jurisdiction. For example, where EM is imposed in broad brush 
strokes as a default condition (such as for all suspects pretrial or for all sex 
offenders post-sentence), it may be safe to presume that EM is being used 
as an added condition in at least some of these instances. 
Meanwhile, the baseline problem, while vexing, is at least not 
omnipresent. Furthermore, due to prison and jail overcrowding as well as 
concerns about the fiscal viability of current incarceration rates, states and 
counties likely will continue turning to EM as an alternative to 
incarceration, whether combined with community confinement programs, 
in conjunction with parole or probation supervision, or in the pretrial 
context. 
However, the substitution/addition distinction demands an increased 
awareness of the relationship between EM use and punitive purposes. 
When EM is used as an alternative to incarceration, it is de facto punitive. 
However, when the same restriction is imposed in the post-sentence 
context, some legislatures and courts have tried to distinguish this post-
sentence use as “merely regulatory.” Yet there is no principled reason 
given as to why the meaning of EM is or should be any different in these 
contexts. As Part I.B demonstrated, EM satisfies the purposes of 
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punishment, and thus can reasonably be favored by reformers seeking to 
reduce incarceration rates as an alternative to imprisonment. By contrast, 
the use of EM as an added sanction results in disproprortionately excessive 
punishment, which is of particular concern given the already severe U.S. 
sentencing system. 
E.  PUNISHMENT THEORY IMPLICATIONS 
Both retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment value 
proportionality and thus would disfavor the use of EM as an added 
condition. The retributivist would be concerned about the use of EM as an 
added condition since, provided that EM causes a non-negligible amount of 
pain, the addition of EM to an already appropriate punishment would run 
afoul of the proportionality requirement. Put simply, if the appropriate 
punishment is deemed to be X, adding EM to X will increase the offender’s 
punishment beyond its appropriately proportionate level. Similarly, even if 
the expressivist might generally favor the use of EM to make an offender’s 
conviction and punishment into a “public spectacle,” inasmuch as the 
principle of proportionality is built into expressivism187—a notion that the 
shame should fit the crime—adding the shaming sanction of EM to a 
preexisting proportionate punishment would seem excessive.188 
Strictly speaking, the deterrence theorist would not favor use of EM as 
an added condition since such use would over-deter criminal conduct.189 If 
the appropriate punishment has already been imposed, as calibrated by the 
principles of deterrence, then the added condition of EM should be 
unnecessary.190 The assertion that society would be safer if all offenders on 
probation or parole were subject to EM may be true in a narrow sense, but 
would not withstand a cost-benefit analysis. For while society may indeed 
be safer if we “incapacitate” more people (whether for suspicious behavior 
or criminal history), this logic would result not only in a sharp uptick in 
EM use, but also in a continued rise in incarceration, since imprisonment is 
 
 187. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
89, 113 (2006). 
 188. While evaluating EM through an expressive lens may be compatible with retributivism, 
expressivism also can be framed as reflective of utilitarianism. Heidi M. Hurd, Expressing Doubts 
About Expressivism, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 429. Instead of being a “scarlet letter,” a utilitarian, 
expressive use of EM might stress the rehabilitative potential of EM. For example, the choice might be 
made to use a tiny monitoring device that is not visible, thus sending the message that we as a society 
want to do whatever possible to aid in the reintegration of ex-offenders. A gap exists in the message-
sending potential of EM between when it is imposed as a lifetime sanction and when EM is integrated 
into a reentry protocol and understood to be temporary. 
 189. See Olsen, supra note 108, at 43. 
 190. This analysis echoes that of retributivism and expressivism. 
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undoubtedly more effective as a means of specific deterrence than is EM 
use. 191  Further, to the extent that EM caseworkers are already 
overburdened, a drastic increase in the number of individuals subject to EM 
would exacerbate this problem, resulting in less responsiveness by those 
tasked with monitoring the EM devices and decreasing the overall efficacy 
of EM use. 
Additionally, where EM is imposed as an added condition solely as a 
means to punish (that is, as a stick rather than a carrot), EM would not 
fulfill rehabilitative goals. An early EM experiment with juveniles in the 
1960s used EM as a means of “positive reinforcement” “to monitor the 
movements of juvenile offenders [to] encourage them to show up to places 
on time.”192 According to one researcher, “[t]he purpose . . . was to give 
rewards to the offenders when they were where they were supposed to be, 
that is they were in drug treatment session, or went to school or a job . . . . 
And then we would signal them that they were eligible for a reward,” 
which might include pizza, a free haircut, or concert tickets.193 He further 
explained, “What really changes behavior are motivational factors, such as 
fun and adventure and pride and accomplishment, recognition, 
affection . . . .” 194  While this example is consistent with rehabilitative 
principles, it is entirely distinct from the way EM currently is used in the 
adult criminal justice context. Absent are rewards and positive 
reinforcement; instead, EM use as an added condition functions as a stick, 
and enhanced supervision creates the possibility for more violations that 
could lead to incarceration. 
III.  THE FUTURE OF MASS MONITORING 
Part III examines the implications of the foregoing analysis for the 
future of mass monitoring. It first addresses the additive uses of EM in the 
post-sentence and pretrial contexts, arguing that these uses are predicated 
on a faulty understanding of criminal justice EM use as “non-punitive” and 
 
 191. Here, analytically, specific deterrence looks a lot like incapacitation, and no one has argued 
that EM is more effective at incapacitating individuals than prison or jail. Even incarceration, however, 
is not a perfect fix, as many inmates over the years have managed to escape from prison and jail. See 
Justin Wm. Moyer, New York Prison Break Just One of 2,000 Per Year, WASH. POST (June 8, 2015), 
http://wpo.st/dR0Q2 (reporting 2,001 prison escapes in 2013). 
 192. Emma Anderson, The Evolution of Electronic Monitoring Devices, NPR, (May 24, 2014, 
5:26 AM), https://n.pr/1pgaSoH. See also Kashann Kilson, How the Best Intentions and Spider-Man 
Helped Launch Ankle Monitors, INVERSE (Nov. 20, 2015), http://inv.rs/b1o. 
 193. Anderson, supra note 192. 
 194. Id. (“Unfortunately, electronic technology has gone to punishment instead of the use of 
positive reinforcement.”). 
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should be revisited by courts and legislatures. It then identifies key policy 
considerations for the future of mass monitoring, concluding that EM as an 
added sanction should be presumptively disfavored and that, even where 
EM is appropriately characterized as punitive and used as a substitute for 
incarceration, policymakers should institute safeguards to promote fairness 
and to avoid the unfettered expansion of this technology. 
A.  DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS FOR “NON-PUNITIVE” USES OF ELECTRONIC 
MONITORING 
This Section scrutinizes the allegedly non-punitive uses of EM in the 
post-sentence and pretrial contexts. It finds that these uses are suspect on 
constitutional and policy grounds. 
First, this Section addresses the constitutional issue. It argues that 
some courts have erred in their assessment of EM as non-punitive in the 
context of “civil” collateral consequences.195 If EM use is appropriately 
understood as punitive, the retroactive imposition of EM after an offender 
has completed his or her sentence should be deemed unconstitutional. Yet 
some courts, including the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, have held that EM is 
non-punitive and that retroactive “lifetime” imposition of EM does not 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Courts are split, as detailed below, and 
this Section suggests that the Supreme Court, when it hears a future case on 
this issue, should find that because EM is punitive, retroactive imposition 
of EM is unconstitutional. 
Second, this Section casts doubt on how legislatures and courts have 
approached EM in the pretrial context. Where states use EM in addition to 
home confinement as a substitute for incarceration in the post-conviction 
context, the values of fairness and consistency counsel that the same 
sanction should “count” as credit toward time served. As with the post-
sentence use of EM, there is no consensus among lower courts, and the 
Supreme Court has yet to consider this issue. 
1.  Retroactive Imposition as a “Civil” Collateral Consequence 
In light of the history and widespread use of EM as a punitive sanction 
and its comportment with punishment theory, claims that the retroactive 
imposition of EM is merely regulatory are specious. Yet such claims 
 
 195. For a historical perspective on collateral consequences, see Chin, supra note 16, at 1793 
(“[T]he systematic loss of legal status, subjecting an individual to numerous collateral consequences, 
has historically been treated as criminal punishment.”). See also Margaret Colgate Love, Managing 
Collateral Consequences in the Sentencing Process  The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model 
Penal Code, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 251–58. 
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abound. At the same time that EM is used increasingly by states as a 
substitute for incarceration—an indisputably punitive sanction—states have 
also imposed EM as a “civil” collateral consequence post-sentence.196 In a 
growing number of states, individuals who have completed their sentences 
are subject to lifetime EM,197  and some states have imposed such EM 
lifetime sentences retroactively.198 
On January 29, 2016, the Seventh Circuit upheld Wisconsin’s 
retroactive imposition of lifetime EM over an Ex Post Facto challenge.199 
The court’s ruling, reversing the district court,200  was premised on the 
notion that EM is not punitive.201 The court reasoned, “Having to wear the 
monitor is a bother, an inconvenience, an annoyance, but no more is 
punishment than being stopped by a police officer on the highway and 
asked to show your driver’s license is punishment, or being placed on a sex 
offender registry . . . .”202 There was no evidence presented to substantiate 
this characterization of EM as a mere “annoyance,” nor did the court 
grapple with existing empirical data that suggest offenders experience EM 
as punitive. 203  The Seventh Circuit opinion also failed to mention the 
existing use of EM as a substitute for incarceration—decidedly a punitive 
use. 
Lower courts are split on this issue, and the Supreme Court has yet to 
weigh in. The Seventh Circuit ruling in Belleau v. Wall comports with prior 
 
 196. See Chin, supra note 16, at 1799–803; supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 197. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 948.012(4) (West 2016) (requiring that any person “who is convicted 
of a life felony for lewd and lascivious molestation” be subject to EM for the rest of their life, if not 
subject to life imprisonment); IND. CODE § 35-50-6-1(f) (West 2016) (requiring that sexually violent 
predators on parole who move to Indiana wear a monitoring device); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3717(u) 
(2016); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.3(A)(3) (2016); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1231 (2016); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 750.520n (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 559.106 (2016) (requiring that “prior sex 
offender[s] . . . be electronically monitored . . . [by] a global positioning system or other technology that 
identifies and records the offender’s location at all times”). 
 198. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-303 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2016). 
 199. Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 937–38 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 200. Belleau v. Wall, 132 F.Supp.3d 1085 (E.D. Wis. 2015), rev’d, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 201. See Belleau, 811 F.3d at 937 (“The monitoring law is not punishment; it is prevention.”). 
 202. Id. But see Lance J. Rogers, Lifetime GPS Ankle Monitor Is Constitutional, BLOOMBERG 
BNA: CRIM. L. REP. (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.bna.com/lifetime-gps-ankle-n57982066905 (discussing 
division among courts as to the punitive nature of EM). 
 203. The court analogized to a posted speed limit, completely ignoring the physical aspects of the 
EM device affixed to the wearer’s body 24/7: “[N]o one thinks that a posted speed limit is a form of 
punishment. It is a punishment trigger if the police catch you violating the speed limit, but police are 
not required to obtain a warrant before stopping a speeding car. The anklet monitor law is the same: it 
tells the plaintiff—if you commit another sex offense, you’ll be caught and punished, because we know 
exactly where you are at every minute of every day.” Belleau, 811 F.3d at 938. 
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decisions by the Sixth Circuit204 and courts in North Carolina205 and South 
Carolina206 holding that retroactive imposition of EM could withstand an 
Ex Post Facto challenge. By contrast, courts in Massachusetts207 and New 
Jersey 208  have ruled that the retroactive imposition of EM is 
unconstitutional. 
In the absence of Supreme Court precedent on the constitutionality of 
retroactive imposition of EM, courts grappling with this issue have relied 
on the Court’s handling of the retroactive imposition of a sex offender 
registration requirement. In Smith v. Doe, which involved the 
constitutionality of Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act,209 the Court 
outlined a two-step process to determine whether the statute at issue was 
punishment or not. 210  First, the court determines whether the state 
legislature intended for the statute to be civil or punitive.211 If the intent 
was punitive, then the statute must be struck down as unconstitutional 
under the Ex Post Facto Clause.212 
If the court determines that the legislature’s intent was non-
punitive,213  then the court next considers the effect of the statute and, 
specifically, whether the statute is so punitive in purpose or effect that the 
 
 204. Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 205. State v. Bowditch, 700 S E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. 2010). 
 206. State v. Nation, 759 S.E.2d 428, 432 (S.C. 2014) (upholding “Jessie’s Law” and finding that 
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 212. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
 213. In Smith, the majority determined that the legislative intent was civil. With no hint of irony, 
the majority noted that “[t]he notification provisions of the Act are codified in the State’s ‘Health, 
Safety, and Housing Code,’ . . . confirming our conclusion that the statute was intended as a 
nonpunitive regulatory measure,” while also maintaining that the fact that the Act’s registration 
provisions are codified in the State’s Code of Criminal Procedure is not dispositive, since “[t]he 
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statute is in fact properly characterized as punishment.214 In determining 
whether Alaska’s law requiring sex offenders to register with the 
Department of Safety could be imposed retroactively, the Supreme Court in 
Smith referred to the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez precedent,215 which set 
forth a balancing test216 to determine whether the statute’s effect is punitive 
or non-punitive for purposes of Ex Post Facto analysis.217 The Smith Court 
applied five “Mendoza-Martinez factors,” examining whether the Act at 
issue “has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; 
imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims 
of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is 
excessive with respect to this purpose.” 218  Over a sharply worded 
dissent,219 the majority found that each factor supported the conclusion that 
the registration requirement was non-punitive.220 There is, however, reason 
to suspect that the Court’s ruling on this issue is inconclusive. The Smith 
case was decided 6-3, and those in the majority included Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Souter, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. 
With only two of these Justices remaining on the Supreme Court, the 
question whether registration requirements are punitive could be resolved 
differently should the Supreme Court hear another similar challenge. 
Furthermore, lower courts that have applied the Smith precedent have 
diverged considerably. While many have upheld laws that retroactively 
require sex offender registration, 221  a 2016 Sixth Circuit opinion 
distinguished Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) from 
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the Alaska law found to be non-punitive by the Supreme Court in Smith.222 
After describing the evolution of SORA from “a non-public registry” to “a 
byzantine code governing in minute detail the lives of the state’s sex 
offenders,”223 the Sixth Circuit applied the five Mendoza-Martinez factors 
and found that the law was punitive in effect.224 The court found that the 
SORA restrictions comported with “the general, and widely accepted, 
definition of punishment offered by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart,”225 and 
that SORA’s requirements resembled both the punishments of shaming and 
parole or probation.226 The court also focused on “the threat of serious 
punishment, including imprisonment” that would accompany a failure to 
comply.227 The court was not convinced by Michigan’s argument that since 
“these restraints are not physical in nature . . . the actual effects are 
therefore ‘minor and indirect.’” 228  The court also observed, “SORA 
advances all of the traditional aims of punishment.”229 Notably, as to the 
question, “Does it have a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose?” 
the court highlighted the “significant doubt cast by empirical studies on the 
pronouncement in Smith that ‘[t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex 
offenders is frightening and high.’”230 The court also criticized SORA for 
its lack of “individualized assessments of proclivities or dangerousness.”231 
Finally, analyzing the question, “Is it excessive with respect to this 
purpose?” the court chided Michigan for “never analyz[ing] recidivism 
rates despite having the data to do so,” concluding that the “punitive 
effects” of SORA “far exceed even a generous assessment of their salutary 
effects.”232 
Courts that confront an Ex Post Facto challenge to retroactive EM 
statutes invariably analyze EM by reference to sex offender registration 
requirements, among other sanctions,233 and they look to the two-part test 
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 233. While sex offenders may be subjected to civil confinement post-sentence, and some may 
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outlined in Smith for guidance.234 Legislators are savvy enough to know 
that their legislation—whether related to sex offender registration or EM—
will be struck down if they explicitly refer to the punitive intent of a 
retroactive statute,235 so they will almost certainly choose not to express 
this intent, regardless of their underlying motivations. 236  Consequently, 
statutes that impose EM retroactively to post-sentence offenders will likely 
survive this first inquiry. 237  Indeed, this inquiry can be understood as 
overdetermined since there is always a public safety or rehabilitative 
rationale for any collateral consequence. 238  To wit, in a Sixth Circuit 
challenge to a Tennessee statute that retroactively imposed EM on sex 
offenders who had completed their sentences, the court reasoned that the 
legislature’s intent was to ensure public safety and rehabilitate sex 
offenders, and that the imposition of EM was intended to be civil and not to 
function as a punishment.239 
Once having determined that an EM law is not punitive in intent, 
courts turn to the question whether that law is punitive in effect. To resolve 
this question, courts have grappled with how the EM sanction relates—with 
respect to level of restrictiveness—to the sex registration sanction at issue 
in Smith. Some courts, as illustrated by the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
Belleau, have grouped sex registration requirements and EM together in a 
broad category of those sanctions that are less restrictive than incarceration, 
determining that neither is punitive in effect.240 Other courts have offered a 
more fine-grained analysis, concluding that EM, while less restrictive than 
incarceration, is more punitive than sex registration requirements, and that 
the monitoring law’s adverse effects are so punitive that they negate 
whatever civil intent was envisioned by the state legislature. 241  For 
example, in Commonwealth v. Cory, a Massachusetts court holding that 
EM was punitive in effect found that compared to a yearly registration 
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requirement, “a requirement permanently to attach a GPS device seems 
dramatically more intrusive and burdensome.”242 The Massachusetts court 
drew a distinction between monitoring and registration, placing monitoring 
closer to incarceration than to registration requirements.243 Courts remain 
divided, and this debate highlights the centrality of the foundational 
question: “What is punitive?”244 
When eventually faced with an Ex Post Facto challenge to a 
retroactive EM law, the Supreme Court should find, as the Sixth Circuit did 
in the context of Michigan’s SORA, that these laws are punitive in effect 
under the Mendoza-Martinez balancing test. First, while EM technology is 
relatively new, it has from its inception been envisioned and used in 
distinctly punitive terms as an alternative to incarceration.245 More broadly, 
EM use in this context “bears a striking resemblance to historical forms of 
punishment” inasmuch as it is “a catalyst for public ridicule—ridicule 
likened to the punishment of public shaming or humiliation,” which are 
“well-recognized historical forms of punishment.”246 Second, EM promotes 
the traditional aims of punishment, serving retributive, expressive, 
deterrent, and rehabilitative ends. 247  Most notably, EM causes pain or 
unpleasantness, which is central to the punishment goals of both 
retributivism and deterrence.248 Third, while EM certainly has a rational 
connection to the non-punitive purpose of protecting public safety, the 
sanction of EM is excessive with respect to this purpose. Central to the 
excessiveness inquiry is “whether the regulatory means chosen are 
reasonable in light of the non-punitive objective.”249 Judge Keith of the 
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Sixth Circuit observed that, even if one assumes that a post-sentence sex 
offender registration requirement is reasonable in light of a non-punitive 
objective, the additional requirement of 24/7 GPS surveillance demands 
further scrutiny.250 He maintained that EM in this context was excessive, 
explaining: 
[B]ecause of the newly enacted satellite-based monitoring program under 
the Surveillance Act, Doe must openly wear a relatively large G.P.S. 
monitoring device—making his offender status known not only to those 
who choose to inquire (via the World Wide Web), but also to the general 
public, namely, those who do not actively seek such information. 
Undeniably, because of the visibly worn monitoring device, Doe’s 
offender status is now known to his co-workers, fellow worshipers at 
church, onlookers at the mall, diners at restaurants, patrons at gas 
stations, passengers on planes, trains, or buses, fans at sporting events, 
moviegoers at theaters, visitors at museums, sightseers, or any other 
person who may be at any conceivable location where Doe rightfully 
chooses to go . . . .251 
Judge Keith reflected further on the punitive nature of EM and why he 
believed it to be excessive: 
[A] public sighting of the modern day “scarlet letter”—the relatively 
large G.P.S. device—will undoubtedly cause panic, assaults, harassment, 
and humiliation. Of course, a state may improve the methods it uses to 
promote public safety and prevent sexual offenses, but requiring Doe to 
wear a visible device for the purpose of the satellite-based monitoring 
program is not a regulatory means that is reasonable with respect to its 
non-punitive purpose.252 
While the Sixth Circuit denied en banc review of an Ex Post Challenge to 
Tennessee’s retroactive EM law, five circuit judges joined Judge Keith’s 
dissent from the denial of rehearing,253 further confirming that this issue 
remains hotly contested. 
In the meantime, courts’ classification of EM as “non-punitive” has 
drastic practical implications. More than 800,000 people are currently 
subject to sex offender registration requirements. 254  In the absence of 
judicial intervention, more states may follow the example set by Tennessee 
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and Wisconsin and pass retroactive “life sentence” statutes imposing EM 
on huge swaths of the post-sentence population. With the increasing use 
and availability of EM technology, it is not unrealistic to imagine a steadily 
increasing number of individuals subject to years, or a lifetime, of EM after 
their sentence is complete. Additionally, under existing jurisprudence, EM 
could be imposed post-sentence on new categories of offenders beyond the 
sex offender population. 
2.  Pretrial Release Conditions and Credit for Time Served 
The foregoing analysis informs two contested questions in the pretrial 
release context: First, how does EM, as a condition of pretrial release, 
compare to pretrial detention? Second, should an individual subject to EM 
as a condition of bail receive credit for time served? That is, should a 
convicted person’s sentence be shortened by the amount of time that person 
already spent subject to EM?  
If EM in the criminal justice context is a punitive sanction, then it is 
error for legislatures and courts to consider pretrial imposition of home 
confinement coupled with EM as noncustodial, and for individuals subject 
to this pretrial sanction not to be eligible for credit for time served. 
Furthermore, the pretrial sanction of EM plus house arrest looks very 
similar to the post-conviction context where EM routinely is used as a 
substitute for incarceration. Thus, claims that this same sanction is non-
punitive in the pretrial context are dubious. 
According to the American Bar Association, in the pretrial context, 
preference should be given to the least restrictive sanction that ensures the 
defendant will not abscond and promotes public safety. Specifically, “[t]he 
law favors the release of defendants pending adjudication of charges. 
Deprivation of liberty pending trial is harsh and oppressive, subjects 
defendants to economic and psychological hardship, interferes with their 
ability to defend themselves, and, in many instances, deprives their families 
of support.” 255  “In deciding pretrial release, the judicial officer should 
assign the least restrictive condition(s) of release that will reasonably 
ensure a defendant’s attendance at court proceedings and protect the 
community, victims, witnesses or any other person.”256 
At the pretrial stage, the judge has three options. From least to most 
 
 255. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE § 10-1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 3d ed. 
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restrictive, they are as follows: The least restrictive option, Level 1, is to 
release the defendant on personal recognizance. The defendant promises to 
appear in court as appropriate, and if the defendant fails to do so, the 
defendant will be held in contempt of court.257 No supervision, money bail, 
or other conditions are imposed.258 The next level of restrictiveness, Level 
2, entails the release of a defendant on a condition or combination of 
conditions, which could include a secured bond, EM, travel and curfew 
restrictions, and job training or drug treatment programs, among others.259 
The most restrictive option, Level 3, is the decision to detain the defendant 
without bail. 
When analyzing EM use at the pretrial stage, the key question is what 
the alternative sanction would be for a particular defendant.260 The two 
most extreme examples are easiest to analyze. If the defendant would 
otherwise be released on personal recognizance, then the imposition of EM 
is an added condition. If the defendant would otherwise be detained 
pretrial, then the imposition of EM is a substitute for pretrial detention. On 
the restrictiveness axis, EM use as a substitute for pretrial detention should 
be preferred, assuming that there is not a significant risk of flight or a 
concern about dangerousness. Furthermore, with respect to cost, use of EM 
as a substitute for pretrial detention should appeal to states, counties, and 
defendants alike.261 By contrast, if the defendant would have been released 
anyway, and EM is merely an added condition, then EM imposes an unduly 
restrictive burden on the defendant and an extra cost on both the defendant 
and the state. Thus, on both axes of restrictiveness and cost, policymakers 
as well as defendants should prefer that, at the pretrial stage, EM be used 
only as a substitute, and that credit for time served be granted to those who 
are subject to home confinement with EM. 
This analysis raises the question: How should policymakers calibrate 
the ratio of incarceration to EM use at the pretrial stage?262 One option 
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would be for states to align pretrial ratios with existing post-conviction 
ratios. For example, since Rhode Island uses a 2:1 ratio (that is, each day of 
post-conviction incarceration can be substituted with two days of EM),263 
for consistency’s sake, perhaps Rhode Island should grant one day of time 
served per each two days an offender spends pretrial on EM.264 By contrast, 
California uses a 1:1 ratio at the post-conviction stage,265 so perhaps the 
computation for time served in California should be 1:1 as well. The 
existence or lack of other conditions imposed is also significant—home 
confinement plus EM resembles the post-conviction community 
confinement alternative enough that it should be presumed sufficiently 
custodial; 266  however, EM with no other restrictions would not seem 
comparably custodial.267 
At the pretrial stage, it will not always be clear whether EM is an 
added condition or whether, if not for EM, a particular defendant would be 
detained. The baseline problem introduced above is particularly acute at the 
pretrial stage because Level 2—the release of a defendant on a condition or 
combination of conditions, which include a secured bond and EM—is a 
vast category. Furthermore, there is unlikely to be a consensus about which 
pretrial release conditions are more or less restrictive. This determination 
will depend substantially on the defendant’s economic circumstances as 
well as other preferences. For example, what of the use of EM when 
defendants simply cannot afford bail? At any time, approximately 500,000 
people are in jail, subject to pretrial detention. 268  Two-thirds of this 
population of pretrial detainees are designated “low bail risk,” which means 
that they pose “no significant risk to themselves or the community, as well 
as representing a low risk of flight.”269 It seems likely that a significant 
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percent of these detainees are only subject to pretrial detention because 
they cannot afford bail.270 Arguably, for this population, the imposition of 
EM would be a significant improvement over pretrial detention.271 Barring 
the first-order solution of calibrating bail for low-risk individuals such that 
none are assigned a bail amount that they cannot afford, pretrial release 
with the requirement of EM may be a next-best solution—a less restrictive 
alternative to detention. This is because, for the low-income defendant, 
money bail, even set at a low amount, may be prohibitive, and it may, de 
facto, result in pretrial detention. 
Where pretrial defendants are subject to EM and house arrest, it must 
be noted that this sanction may look strikingly similar to the post-
conviction context where EM is used as an alternative to incarceration.272 
However, courts have routinely treated these two contexts as entirely 
different: while EM use post-conviction is understood to serve as a 
substitute for incarceration, EM use at the pretrial stage, even when 
coupled with home confinement, has been deemed by many courts to be 
noncustodial, and thus does not qualify toward credit for time served. 
Many state courts have held that, unlike pretrial detention, the pretrial 
imposition of EM coupled with home confinement is insufficiently 
custodial and therefore does not accrue credit toward an offender’s 
sentence.273 Ohio courts have defined confinement as “requir[ing] such a 
restraint on the defendant’s freedom of movement that he cannot leave 
official custody of his own volition.” 274  But instead of examining 
conditions of confinement, the courts have distinguished between 
confinement and “official custody,” making it impossible for defendants to 
accrue credit for time served unless they are detained. In Indiana, courts 
have examined pretrial confinement conditions, ultimately concluding that 
home confinement was not “substantially similar” to pretrial detention.275 
A Kansas court even refused to find that a defendant who was 
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electronically monitored and “‘locked down’ 24 hours a day” experienced 
“confinement.”276 Courts in Kentucky have distinguished between “custody 
as it relates to escape” and custody as it relates to credit for time served, 
holding that home confinement satisfies the first but not the second.277 
Federal courts also typically have found that home confinement 
coupled with EM as a condition for pretrial release does not qualify for 
credit toward time served. The Second Circuit found that while home 
confinement with EM was indeed restrictive, it does not meet the 
requirements to be considered “official detention” as understood in the Bail 
Reform Act.278 The Eastern District of New York has held that time spent 
in home confinement does not qualify for time toward a subsequent 
sentence.279 
A few courts that have yet to consider this issue have hinted that, if 
confronted with a question about whether a defendant subject to home 
confinement with EM pretrial should be granted credit for time served, they 
might depart from existing precedent. For example, while courts in 
California and Montana were unwilling to grant defendants credit for time 
served when EM was a condition of the defendants’ release on bond, these 
courts stressed that the defendants were not also subject to home 
confinement during that time,280 suggesting that the combination of EM 
and home confinement might be sufficiently custodial. Ultimately, this 
remains an open question for future judicial consideration. In the 
meantime, to avoid inconsistency, policymakers should acknowledge that 
pretrial EM with home confinement looks virtually identical to post-
conviction EM use as part of a community confinement program, and they 
should introduce legislation that would enable defendants subject to these 
pretrial conditions to accrue credit for time served. 
B.  PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Use of EM as an added condition does not offer the benefits of 
alleviating prison overcrowding or aggregate cost savings and should be 
disfavored. To guard against the imposition of EM as an added condition, 
 
 276. State v. Guzman, 112 P.3d 120, 122 (Kan. 2005). 
 277. Norris v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-CA-001152-MR, 2010 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 369, at 
*2 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2010); Buford v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 490, 492 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). 
 278. See United States v. Edwards, 960 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3585(b), pertaining to credit toward a term of imprisonment for prior custody). 
 279. Kaiser v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 3d 301, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 280. See State v. Lamere, No. DA 11-0278, 2011 Mont. LEXIS 419, at *4–5 (Mont. Dec. 6, 
2011); People v. Anaya, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47, 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
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certain guidelines for decisionmakers should be adopted. An individualized 
assessment and justification should be required for any decision to impose 
EM where EM appears to be an added condition. For example, post-
sentence, the decision to impose EM should be regarded as presumptively 
improper unless the alternative is civil commitment. And in cases where 
post-sentence EM serves as a substitute for civil commitment, there should 
be regular, individualized assessment. 281  The decision to impose EM 
should be subject to regular review and should never be permanent. Under 
no circumstance should there be post-sentence imposition of EM “life 
sentences.” If EM is used (ill-advisedly) as an added condition rather than 
as a substitute for incarceration, the financial burden of EM always should 
lie with the government. 
Policymakers should take into account the potential adverse 
consequences, even if unintended, of any increase in criminal justice uses 
of EM, especially when new populations are targeted. Even where EM is 
used chiefly as a substitute for incarceration, policymakers should be 
vigilant. A holistic assessment of the costs and benefits—both financial and 
non-financial—of EM is indispensable to prevent the overreach of EM and 
to avoid the pitfalls of an overextended, underachieving system of mass 
monitoring. This Section explores implications for financing mass 
monitoring and for gathering data and evaluating the effectiveness of 
monitoring programs. 
1.  Financing Mass Monitoring 
The stakeholders with a financial interest in mass monitoring include 
governments (national, state, and local), private vendors, and individuals 
subject to EM. It is crucial to consider the financial implications of 
increased EM use for governments who stand to save considerably by using 
EM as a substitute for incarceration, for private vendors whose incentives 
favor broad expansion of EM programs, and for monitored individuals who 
often are expected to pay their own monitoring costs. Strict oversight of 
private vendors and program managers in the EM industry is necessary to 
avoid conflicts of interest and to ensure that EM does not become a tool for 
financial enrichment of the private sector at the expense of both 
government and low-income individuals. 
 
 281. While courts and scholars may dispute the appropriate standard of proof for civil 
commitment, there is no question that an individual assessment is required. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, 
Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 300–05 (2011). 
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States and private vendors have starkly different financial incentives. 
EM expansion may prove a cost-saving mechanism for states, but only if 
used as a substitute for incarceration and not as an added condition. By 
contrast, EM vendors have strong incentives to encourage states to expand 
their use of EM technology at every stage of the criminal justice process as 
both a substitute and an added condition. 
For those private prison companies that are already heavily invested in 
EM, it would be financially advantageous to encourage EM use as an 
addition rather than as a substitute for incarceration. This is because the 
same firm could both incarcerate the offender and provide the EM device at 
the pretrial stage and upon the person’s release—perhaps for the rest of that 
person’s life. Indeed, private vendors should prefer that every person 
eligible for pretrial release is subject to EM, even if they have already 
posted bail, and that states broaden requirements for EM use post-sentence.  
States should pay heed to the incentives of private vendors and push 
back against vendor arguments that EM use should be expanded beyond 
use as a substitute for incarceration. One significant hurdle, however, is 
that states tend to offset their costs by charging monitored persons for the 
cost of their EM devices. Only by changing this funding mechanism can 
policymakers begin to realign these incentives. 
Requiring monitored individuals to contribute to the cost of EM raises 
concerns about the creation of perverse incentives since monitoring is thus 
“not only . . . cost effective but income generating as well . . . when 
administered by the state.”282 Additionally, this pay structure raises equity 
concerns as it, like other fee-based systems in the criminal justice realm, 
has an unequal effect on the poor.283 As with money bail in the pretrial 
context, indigent defendants may be forced to await trial or complete a 
sentence in jail for the sole reason that they are unable to pay the required 
fees to support monitoring. By contrast, some jurisdictions allow wealthy 
 
 282. Kilgore, supra note 166, at 136. Some have suggested that the strong interest of private 
industry in EM may have led to overzealousness about its effectiveness. See, e.g., Alladina, supra note 
165, at 129–30. 
 283. See Leah A. Plunkett, Captive Markets, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 59 (2013). For a general 
overview of criminal justice fees incurred by defendants, see Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, 
Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175; Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing 
and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 831 (2014). See also Starr, 
supra, at 831 (discussing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 663 (1983), which held that “incarcerating 
a defendant merely because he was unable to pay amounted to unconstitutional wealth-based 
discrimination”). 
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defendants to pay for GPS monitoring in order to avoid pretrial 
detention.284 
These inequities are particularly problematic if individuals subject to 
EM use as an addition are made to bear the financial burden of this 
sanction. This is not a theoretical concern, but rather a growing practical 
reality that must be addressed. In some jurisdictions, EM—in addition to 
posting bail—is a routine condition for pretrial release, and accused 
individuals are required to pay for their monitoring devices. 285  For 
example, “[i]n Richland County, South Carolina, any person ordered to 
wear the ankle monitor as a condition of their bail must lease the bracelet 
from a private, for-profit company called Offender Management Services 
(OMS), which charges the offender $9.25 per day, or about $300 per 
month, plus a $179.50 set-up fee.” 286  This arrangement can have dire 
consequences for low-income defendants (such as one Richland County 
individual who reported “liv[ing] on a monthly $900 disability check”),287 
but both private companies and cash-strapped counties stand to gain. One 
public defender familiar with this Richland County practice explained that 
if an offender cannot or does not pay an EM bill, that individual will be 
sent back to jail, describing this system as “a newfangled debtor’s prison. 
People are pleading guilty because it’s cheaper to be on probation than it is 
to be on electronic monitoring.”288 South Carolina is not unique in this 
regard. In twenty-nine states, offenders are expected to pay a fee for their 
monitoring device.289 
Changes in contracting and compensation schemes for EM could 
drastically shift the incentives of EM providers, and states should take steps 
to avoid giving private monitoring vendors an incentive to expand EM.290 
 
 284. See, e.g., William Saletan, Get Out of Jail Unfree, SLATE (June 1, 2011, 11:11 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2011/06/get_out_of_jail_unfree.html. 
This practice raises concerns about a lack of equality based on socioeconomic status and the 
involvement of the private sector in criminal justice. See supra note 283. 
 285. Markowitz, supra note 179. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. Indeed, for some low-income defendants, the EM fees and associated costs are 
prohibitive. This reality challenges the notion that complying with the requirements of EM merely 
requires awareness or conscientiousness on the part of offenders. See, e.g., Button et al., supra note 4, at 
432 (“Officers will need to take special care explaining to offenders the importance of remaining up-to-
date on all fines, fees, and financial obligations.”). 
 288. Markowitz, supra note 179 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 289. Button et al., supra note 4, at 427. Some states have instituted a sliding scale, but others have 
failed to address the special problems associated with low-income offenders who may not be able to 
afford the cost of their monitoring. Id. 
 290. For detailed suggestions about changing private-sector incentives to promote rehabilitation, 
see Eisenberg, supra note 175, at 124–31 (proposing reforms for contracting and compensation in the 
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For example, states could insist that contracts with private providers be tied 
to rehabilitative metrics.291 This way, providers would not be compensated 
more the longer someone is monitored, and private companies would not 
receive extra monetary rewards for distributing faulty monitors that lead to 
either longer periods of time subject to EM or incarceration. 
2.  Measuring Effectiveness 
Improved data collection and analysis are crucial to determine the 
effectiveness of EM programs. They are also indispensable to the 
development of metrics that could be used to encourage public-sector 
corrections authorities and private firms to improve outcomes. Studies of 
EM’s crime-reduction effects are sparse, and they tend to involve 
extremely small samples. 292  Despite their shortcomings, however, pilot 
programs in various states have yielded results suggesting that EM, as a 
principal component of post-release programs, may contribute to a 
reduction in recidivism.293 One study, which involved offenders convicted 
of a range of crimes, demonstrated that in the post-release context, 
monitored individuals were 94.7 percent less likely to reoffend than others 
who remained unmonitored post-incarceration. 294  Another study 
specifically observing high-risk sex offenders found that the monitored 
group was 38 percent less likely to return to custody than the control group 
in a typical parole setting. 295  Notably, these studies did not compare 
recidivism rates between the monitored and unmonitored populations after 
the group subject to EM was released from surveillance.296 Existing studies 
 
context of private prisons). 
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have been criticized on the basis of selection problems (that is, the concern 
that “at least one potential criterion for the granting of electronic 
monitoring to an offender is her or his risk of recidivism”) and the 
differential risk of the sample populations (that is, “the possibility that 
electronic monitoring programs are restricted to low-risk populations”).297 
Future empirical work could investigate whether expanded monitoring 
in fact leads to less incarceration.298 At a minimum, scholars could use 
differential rates of EM expansion as a natural experiment to determine 
whether states that enthusiastically embraced EM experienced decreased 
incarceration compared with states that adopted it more slowly.299 Ideally, 
when states expand their EM programs, they could be encouraged to 
perform a randomized control trial in which certain randomized and 
representative counties or courthouses are given earlier access to new 
monitoring resources.300 Scholars could then compare whether these local 
jurisdictions imposed less pretrial detention and shorter sentences than the 
comparable control group. 
To improve on prior studies, it will be necessary to compare like 
populations, to distinguish between uses of EM at different criminal justice 
stages, and, to the extent discernible, to denote when EM is used as an 
added condition and when it is used as a substitute for incarceration. 
Relevant metrics and outcomes will be different depending on the criminal 
justice stage. For example, at the bail stage, it will be crucial to measure 
how often individuals jump bail and to compare outcomes over the same 
time period between those who are subject to EM and those who are not 
monitored. At the post-sentence stage, in order to assess EM’s relationship 
to recidivism, it will be necessary to compare individuals who have 
completed EM with those who have completed their time in prison or jail. 
Ultimately, at each criminal justice stage, the most helpful comparison will 
be between outcomes of those subject to EM and those not subject to EM 
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during the period when the sentence is in effect and during the subsequent 
period when the individual is no longer subject to criminal sanction. Such 
comparisons are the only way to reconcile competing claims about the 
crime-reduction effect of EM. 
Collecting data on the efficacy of monitoring technology itself also 
should be a high priority for empirical research. If EM technology is not 
functioning appropriately, it may end up requiring additional resources, it 
may jeopardize public safety, and baseless arrest warrants may violate the 
rights of individuals who are abiding by their ordered conditions.301 
Documented cases of false negatives and false positives have cast 
doubt on the reliability of GPS equipment for EM use. Cases involving 
undetected incidents of offenders tampering with GPS technology have 
raised concerns about public safety.302 There have also been reports of false 
alerts, some of which may result in incarceration.303  According to one 
report, “Wisconsin’s GPS tracking system repeatedly fails, registering false 
alerts and landing the offenders in jail although they have done nothing 
wrong.”304 One offender subject to EM explained, “There are times when 
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I’m afraid to leave whatever room I’m in, even to go to the 
bathroom. . . . I’m afraid an alert will go off and the police will show up at 
my door.”305 
Given that there are many suppliers of EM technology, improved 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements would enable states to make 
more informed choices about which vendor to choose and would provide 
vendors with an incentive to improve their products to reduce the 
likelihood of both false negatives and false positives. At present, reports 
about the effectiveness of EM technology are not regularly kept. For 
example, in Wisconsin, a Department of Corrections spokesperson 
admitted that, despite repeated complaints about false positives, “the 
agency does not keep statistics on how many alerts are triggered for GPS 
offenders, and does not track how often these result in offenders being 
incarcerated.” 306  Such failures to measure the effectiveness of EM 
technology are not only irresponsible, but they also run counter to any 
desire to improve EM technology. 
Another significant impediment to EM outcomes may be the physical 
characteristics of the monitoring devices. Remarkably, the size and weight 
of EM devices have not changed significantly in years, despite 
technological advances that have made it possible to create a device that is 
smaller and less obtrusive. 307  This is particularly notable given the 
competition among EM providers and the typical trajectory of 
technological devices getting increasingly small and lightweight. In fact, 
developments in monitoring technology beyond the corrections domain 
belie any suggestion that updating the technology is not possible.308 One 
defendant observed, “I don’t know who designs these, but I think they 
design them to punish the wearer physically as well as mentally. . . . With 
today’s technology I feel there is absolutely no reason this be so large, 
surely these were engineered by very hateful people intent on inflicting 
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further punishment.”309 Policymakers who favor easing the challenge of 
reentry should encourage vendors to improve EM technology, both to 
minimize the risk of false positives that may hinder the ability of wearers to 
be reliable employees, often through no fault of their own, and to create 
less obtrusive EM devices. 
CONCLUSION 
Founding myths are important but not always enduring. When first 
introduced, prisons were considered progressive—a “humane alternative” 
to the death penalty; 310  they were designed to foster reflection, 
introspection, and rehabilitation. Similarly, when EM was pioneered, it was 
considered an enlightened alternative to incarceration, even a way 
eventually to eliminate prisons and jails. Yet EM technology is not 
inherently rehabilitative, nor is it inherently cost saving or progressive. 
The staggering failure of mass incarceration is a sobering reminder 
that, whatever the intention of a new penal policy or reform measure, it is 
crucial to look closely at the incentives it sets into motion and to guard 
against unchecked expansion of the criminal justice system and associated 
human and financial costs. The role of criminal justice EM will only 
continue to increase as this technology becomes cheaper and more reliable. 
The contours of its use, however, remain an open question. This Article’s 
sustained analysis of the origins and history of mass monitoring and its 
functions is a crucial first step toward clarifying conflicting rhetoric around 
EM, revealing existing doctrinal inconsistencies, and charting a path 
forward to ensure that EM plays a productive and carefully circumscribed 
role in alleviating rather than exacerbating the failings of the criminal 
justice system. 
* * * 
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